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PROGRESS ON THE CAUSAL CHAIN
GANG: SOME APPROACHES TO
CAUSATION IN TORT LAW AND
STEPS TOWARD A LINGUISTIC
ANALYSIS
By STEPHEN N. PlNcus*
The problem of causation impinges upon virtually every area of the law. In this
article, Mr. Pincus takes a novel approach to this complex problem in the context
of tort law. He begins by highlighting some of the difficult causal issues that emerge
from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and a recent test case on nuclear experiments
conducted in Nevada a number of decades ago. He identifies ten prototype cases
of causation through the rich doctrinal history in this area, arguing that fundamental
problems arise not only at the margin, but permeate even "simple" cases of causation.
Three theoretical approaches are then critically examined- the commitment to purely
'factual" causal tests; the view that causal judgments are determined by social or
economic policies; and Hart and Honori's classic attempt to avoid these "maximalist"
and "minimalist"extremes. Mr. Pincus argues that none of these approaches adequately
deals with the fundamental problems outlined Accordingly, he undertakes a linguistic
analysis, developing a descriptive model for understanding causation that might also
be applied to other legal problems Finally, he suggests that legislation be used to
improve causal determinations within the tort system, and that in some circumstances
injuries be compensated outside it
"In the area of causation, nothing is ever thought out; it is only thought about."'
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1. INTRODUCTION
Are lawyers too dependent on language to subject it to their scrutiny?
Recent interest in legal hermeneutics goes beyond attempts to get lawyers
to write "plainer" English2 or to explain - in political terms - why
they "can't."3 Yet most of the work in this area suffers from two limitations.4
First, it has focused on the ready-made constitutional and statutory texts
of public law. There is no reason, however, why the analysis of language
2 See, for example, R.C. Wydick, "Plain English for Lawyers" (1978) 66 Cal. Law Rev. 727,
and L Younger, "In Praise of Simplicity" (1984) N.Z.LJ. 277.
3 See, for example, S. Stark, "Why Lawyers Can't Write(?)" 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1389.
4 See, for example, 60 Texas L. Rev., passim, and 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1-725. There are two
notable exceptions to the first limitation. M. Moore and P. Goodrich each present elaborate accounts
of judicial discourse, though from radically different ideological vantage points. Moore provides
a linguistic analysis of the interpretation of common law texts in "The Semantics of Judging"
(1981) 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 151 and "A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation" (1985) 58 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 277. See also infra, note 217. Goodrich examines how the theology of law is grounded
in and determined by its language: Reading the Law (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986). See also
infra, note 200.
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should not be applied to the equally (if not more) text-rich common
law. Second, this work has mostly theorized about the potential ap-
plication of the philosophy of language to law, rather than actually applying
it to a particular legal problem. This article attempts to go beyond these
two limitations by examining the problem of causation in tort law from
a linguistic perspective.
At the heart of the law and hermeneutics debate lies an old and
fundamental question: how can a judge both create and apply the law?
One explanation draws on the theory of literary interpretation and depicts
the law as a "chain enterprise."s In adding a link to this chain, each
judge expresses her or his legal philosophy. This philosophy, however,
comprises not only the judge's substantive political values, but also her
or his sense of how the new link can best fit the formal pattern established
by the previous links in the chain. The thrust of this explanation is to
steer a path between legal positivism6 and judicial anarchy, but it escapes
neither. The idea of making the new link fit with doctrine or statute
is little more than what less sophisticated minds thought of "as applying
the law,"7 while "any judge's opinion about the best interpretation will
... be the consequence of beliefs other judges need not share."8 Thus,
it has been suggested that these schizophrenic judges are "working on
the chain gang."9
It is difficult to imagine a stronger catalyst of these formalist
aspirations and nihilist declamations than the problem of causation.
Determining the causal chains within a set of events is widely assumed
5 See R. Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation" (1984) 60 Texas L. Rev. 527 at 548, and also
"Natural Law Revisited" (1982) 34 U. Florida L. Rev. 165 at 168.
6 Legal positivism differs from textual positivism, though legal and textual positivists have
the same views on many issues. S. Fish appears to conflate the two in arguing that R. Dworkin's
"Law as Interpretation" (supra, note 5) "depends on the 'positivist analysis' he rejects.. ." S. Fish,
"Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature" (1984) 60 Texas L. Rev.
551 at 566. Clearly, Dworkin's argument leads to an untenable epistemological paradox (see infra,
note 207); in fairness to Dworkin, however, it should be pointed out that the following statement
of Fish's is not completely accurate: "In general Dworkin's confusions have the same form: he
argues against positivism, but then he has recourse to positivist notions" (Fish, ibid. at 567, fn.
23).
As I argue in Part IV.A.7, infra, Dworkin's theory of legal interpretation - despite his protestations
otherwise - is committed to a form of objectivity. This identifies him unmistakeably as a textual
positivist. However, the pervasiveness of naturalism throughout his work makes it very difficult
to locate him in the camp of legal positivism. As Fish demonstrates, Dworkin's attack on legal
positivism from a textual positivist stance leads to various contradictions; but this does not make
Dworkin a legal positivist.
7 See infra, note 217.
8 See Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation", supra, note 5 at 545.
9 See Fish, supra, note 6.
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to be a purely factual undertaking,,o but it reveals a judge's fundamental
assumptions about the physical, social, and moral universes within which
these events occur. The problem has been most extensively dealt with
in tort, which is also, perhaps, the area of law most replete with concepts
expressed in apparently ordinary language.,, Yet causation is either
explicitly or implicitly involved in almost every set of facts brought before
a court in any area of the law.
In Part I of this article, some of the central issues associated with
the problem of "cause in fact" in tort law are highlighted. It is suggested
that the difficulties involved in grappling with the problem of causation
are not confined to an obscure set of marginal cases, but permeate every
situation in which we attempt to locate causal relationships. In Part Ill,
three theoretical approaches to the issues outlined in Part II are examined.
This discussion begins with Hart and Honor6's "ordinary language"
analysis,,2 and then turns to the positions Hart and Honor6 attempt to
avoid: causal maximalism and causal minimalism.1 A causal maximalist
views causation as comprising a maximum of "factual" content.4 A causal
minimalist, in contrast, infuses causation with a minimum of factual
content and a maximum of legal policy. Causal minimalism deals with
the problem of causation by ignoring it and views causal language as
a tool of legal policy, without any power to determine that policy.
Against the backdrop provided by the critique of these approaches,
an alternative approach is proposed in Part IV. This linguistic model
is a descriptive account of how causal decisions are made by judges
in tort cases. The model uses a metaphor depicting causal reality, our
10 This article does not deal directly with issues generally subsumed under the heading "proximate
cause." Hart and Honor6 argue that the use of the expression 'proximate cause' today is a mere
reminder that demonstration of "cause in fact" is an insufficient condition for the imposition of
liability (see infra, note 12 at 86-87), thus suggesting that even if defendant's tort was indisputably
a cause of plaintiff's injury, it may not be a legally relevant cause. R. Wright criticizes Hart and
Honor6 for not further distinguishing "proximate cause" from "tortious conduct" (see infra, note
14 at 1745-50). R. Epstein would want to eliminate both these latter notions and rely entirely
on "cause in fact" for the imposition of liability within a strict liability regime (see infra, note
11). Although my linguistic analysis is focused on "cause in fact," "proximate cause" is susceptible
to the same treatment. Moreover, the analysis of CASE 10 in Part lI.B.4, infra, suggests that the
boundaries between "cause in fact" and "proximate cause" are far from clear.
11 See tRA. Epstein, "A Theory of Strict Liability" (1973) 2 J. Leg. Stud. 151. Consider also
the following comment: "Tort law is the paradigmatic law of the mixed society; an industrial
community that opts for the middle ground between the individualistic, laissez-faire policy which
prefers contracts and the truly collective state which favours criminal sanctions.": A.C. Hutchinson
and P. Monahan, Modem Legal Wrought Cases and Materials (Osgoode Hall Law School, Winter
1984) at 11.
12 See H.L.A. Hart and T. Honor6, Causation in the Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1985).
13 See ibid at xxxiv-xxxvi and lxvil-lxxvii.
'4 See R.W. Wright, "Causation in Tort Law," [1985] Cal. L. Rev. 1735.
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discourse about that reality, and our perception and understanding of
it, as a web within which language is used to posit particular causal
relationships. It is argued that in making causal decisions, this web must
be dissected along lines that are vague or even arbitrary. Accordingly,
this model implies that while the tort system generally provides a practical
framework for compensating injuries, legislation may be used to make
clearer and better causal determinations within that framework. Moreover,
it is suggested that in some circumstances a legislature may be required
to venture beyond the tort system to ensure the compensation of injuries
that are in a very real sense caused by the aggregate of physical, chemical,
social, economic, and political events constituting the web of causation.
II. THE ISSUES
A. From Nevada to Chemobyl ... and Back
On or about April 26, 1986, a series of events occurred at the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant, located 130 kilometres north of Kiev
in the U.S.S.R. In the weeks following these events, clouds of radioactive
material were observed in the atmosphere over Eastern Europe and
unusually high levels of radioactive iodine were detected in rainwater
in Ottawa, Canada.
The Soviet Union reported that a certain number of people had
died in the accident15 Few people would see any difficulty in the claim
that these victims died from the accident. Judging from newspaper
treatment of the issue, most people do not appear to have difficulty
inferring from the occurrence at Chernobyl and the detection in Canada,
that the nuclear accident caused the 10,000-fold increase over background
levels of iodine-131 in Ottawa's rainwater.16 Yet these events - of
profound scientific, political, and legal,7 significance - present other
15 See, for example, The Globe and Mail (Toronto): April 29, 1986 at Al and A13; April
30, 1986 at AI-2; May 1, 1986 at A1-2; May 9, 1986 at A10 and May 15, 1986 at Al and
A9.
16 See ibid The language of the reports about the milk, however, is a little less certain. For
example, according to The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 15, 1986 at A9, the Minister of Health
stated that there was "'nothing to be concerned about, but there was a trace [of radioactive-iodine]'
... suggesting the milk was likely contaminated from grass eaten by cows after radioactive rain
fell in the Ottawa area last week" (emphasis added).
17 Consider this reaction: "In the Commons yesterday, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark
said the Government would consider filing claims with the Soviet Union for compensation if any
financial damages result from the elevated levels of radioactivity in the Canadian environment
springing from the Chernobyl accident" (ibid).
Assuming a causal link between the Chernobyl accident and the increased levels of iodine-131
in Ottawa cannot be or are not "proved," it is interesting to reflect on whether there still might
be a causal link between the accident and the "financial damages" arising from the precautions
taken by the Canadian government in light of the accident.
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causal issues that cannot be as easily disposed of. Such issues have
implications that may undermine the certainty with which we make the
"easy" causal judgments.
These issues may best be approached, not by speculating on the
possible aftermath of Chernobyl over the next few decades, but by
considering a recent case arising out of the United States government's
experiments with nuclear fission, conducted above ground in the brush-
lands of Nevada a number of decades ago. In May 1984, the U.S. District
Court handed down a 225 page judgment explaining why it found that
ten of the twenty-four bell-weather cases brought in Allen v. United Stateso8
merited compensation. The court found that the defendant failed to
adequately warn the plaintiffs or their predecessors of "known or
foreseeable long-range biological consequences" from exposure to fallout
radiation from open-air atomic testing prior to 1963, and that such failure
was negligent.,9 One of the court's major problems in reaching this
conclusion was to determine whether and in what sense there was a
causal link between this negligent breach of duty, and the many serious
injuries sustained by the plaintiffs or their predecessors. The crux of this
problem is how to give meaning to the court's phrase "known or
foreseeable long-range biological consequences."20
The difficulty is most obvious in an ex ante, scientific context. In
the Chernobyl situation, the only response Canadian Health Department
officials can give to the question of whether the radioactive iodine in
Ottawa's rainwater will cause injury is of this form: "A person drinking
the contaminated rainwater for a lifetime would increase the risk of
cancer by only one chance in one milhion."2, In this scientific context,
it appears to be accepted that the making of an ex post causal assertion
involves an arbitrary definitional decision. For example, a public health
scientist pointed out in regard to the Chernobyl disaster that
by international standards it is accepted that one hundred deaths will occur among
one million people upon one rem exposure to ionizing radiation ... exposure can
depress the immune system, which ... allows the cancerous cells in the body
to grow. But because the origin of cancer may be from causes other than radiation,
such deaths are not counted as being directly caused by exposure to radiation2
2
(emphasis added).
IS 588 F.Supp. 247 (Dist. C.). All references to the Allen case in this article are to thisjudgment,
which was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). The Court
of Appeals did not consider the causation issue because it found that the "discretionary function"
exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act precluded government liability. Cert. was denied by the
United States Supreme Court, January, 1988.
19 Ibid at 447.
20 Ibid.
21 The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 10, 1986 at Al.
22 Dr. Bertell, Director of Research, International Institute for Public Health, Toronto, in The
Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 5, 1986.
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The Allen case shows that precisely the same meaning of causation
may apply in an ex post, legal context. For instance, the court cited
one medical authority who points out that "when we refer to radiation
as a cause ... we simply mean that a population exposed to a certain
dose of radiation will show a greater incidence of cancer than that same
population would have shown in the absence of the added radiation."23
This is a quite different use of the word 'cause' from that which most
people would associate with the following sentence: "the Chernobyl
accident caused the 10,000-fold increase over background levels of iodine-
131 in Ottawa's rainwater." If there were some way to track a particular
particle of iodine-131, it would be easy to construe this sentence
probabilistically. One might be less comfortable with a probabilistic
interpretation of causation in this sentence: "the Chernobyl accident caused
the clouds of radioactive material observed over Kiev during the weeks
after the accident." The meaning of 'cause' seems to be even more clearly
different from the Allen usage in this sentence: "the Chernobyl accident
caused the clouds of radioactive material observed over Chernobyl
immediately after the accident." Accordingly, there is a continuum running
from those causal assertions about which we feel more certain to those
that appear to be completely tenuous. Is it possible in principle for there
to be any limiting cases at the extreme of absolute certainty?
Suppose we were able to track a particle of iodine-131 from the
Chernobyl reactor to Ottawa, Kiev, or even the skies over Chernobyl.
It seems indisputable that the nuclear accident could then be said to
have "caused" this particle to hover in the atmosphere. By pointing to
any other physical, chemical, social, economic, or political conditions
that constitute necessary antecedents of this event, we recognise that
the "nuclear accident" is an insufficient cause, not that it is not a cause.
We know from Heisenberg, however, that "no events, not even atomic
events, can be described with certainty, that is, with zero tolerance."24
23 J. Gofman, M.D., "Radiation and Human Health" (1981), 54-55, quoted in Allen, supra,
note 18 at 405.
24 See L Bronowski, The Ascent of Man (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1976)
at 365. Bronowski's source is W. Heisenberg's Uberden anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoreischen
Ainematik und Mechani, Zeitschriftfur Physik, 1927. Bronowski's anecdotes on the history of science
provide simple but powerful illustrations of the coextensivity of the natural sciences and metaphysics.
Consider, for example, the backdrop against which he sets his description of Heisenberg's principle
(at 362-64):
Did physics in the 1920s really consist of argument, seminar, discussion, dispute? Yes, it
did. Yes, it still does ... that requires, not calculation, but insight, imagination - if you
like, metaphysics. I remember a phrase that Max Born used.... He said. "I am now convinced
that theoretical physics is actual philosophy." Max Born meant that the new ideas in physics
amount to a different view of reality. The world is not a fixed solid array of objects, out
there, for it cannot be fully separated from our perception of it. It shifts under our gaze,
it interacts with us, and the knowledge that it yields has to be interpreted by us. There
is no way of exchanging information that does not demand an act of judgment.
19861
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For Heisenberg, atomic events involve particles whose location, on one
hand, and path and speed of motion, on the other, cannot ever be
concurrently specified. This suggests that tracking a particle, while not
impossible, may not yield results which will add certainty to our causal
assertions. Some of the atomic models proposed by other physicists suggest
that tracking a particle of iodine-131 might be an inappropriate way
of attempting to confirm the cause of a shift in the substance's position
because iodine-131 is composed of waves or probabilities rather than
particles.- In short, the most obvious empirical method of confirming
the certainty of our causal assertions leads us directly to an awareness
of the probabilistic character of causation. Indeed, probability itself is
only one imperfect approximation of causation. This point has vividly
been made in a comparison of Heisenberg's atomic model with the models
of his colleagues: ".... whatever fundamental units the world is put
together from, they are more delicate, more fugitive, more startling than
we catch in the butterfly net of our senses."26
As the spatio-temporal distance between "causes" and "effects"
increases, the probabilistic character of causation becomes more obvious.
Thus, the court in Allen stated: "Like statistical significance, mathematical
probability aids in resolving the complex questions of causation raised
by this lawsuit, but is not itself the answer to those questions."7 What
the court does regard as answering those questions is not clear. At least
at a formal level, the court in Allen followed the traditional common
law approach of separating the question of factual causation from the
legal issues of duty, breach, and damages.2s After an eclectic sampling
of pronouncements on causation,29 the judgment adds yet another vague,
open-ended verbal formula to the well-saturated judicial lexicon of tests
of "cause in fact":
Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiological hazard which puts an
identifiable population group at increased risk, and a member of that group at
risk develops a biological condition which is consistent with having been caused
by the hazard to which he has been negligently subjected, such consistency having
been demonstrated by substantial appropriate, persuasive, and connecting factors,
a fact finder may reasonably conclude that the hazard caused the condition absent
persuasive proof to the contrary offered by the defendant30 (emphasis partly added).
2 Ibid at 362-64.
26 Ibid at 364. The electron is viewed as a particle in Bohr's atom, as a wave in de Broglie's,
and as a wave of probability in Max Born's model.
27 Supra, note 18 at 419.
28 See ibid at 404-43.
29 From those of Prosser (see, eg., ibid at 405 and 412; cf. Prosser, infra, note 42) to those
of Malone see for example, ibid at 410 and 411; cf Malone, infira, note 70.
30 Ibid at 415.
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The language here is instructive. Couched in the traditional phra-
seology of the common law, this formulation attempts to maintain the
separation between breach of duty ("negligently creates a... hazard"),
causation ("consistency ... demonstrated by substantial ... connecting
factors"), and damage ("a biological condition"). Those familiar with
this type of language would assume that this rule involves at least the
three distinct questions of "hazard," "condition," and "demonstrated
consistency." Upon reflection, the third question melts into the first two.
All substantial, appropriate, persuasive, or connecting factors between
the hazard and the condition are a part of the hazard, or the condition,
or of both. The examples that the court gives of such factors include:
"that [the] plaintiff resided in geographical proximity to the Nevada Test
Site for some time between 1951 and 1962," and "the probability that
[the] plaintiff was exposed.... ." These are obviously an integral part
of the "hazard." The other example - "that [the] plaintiffs injury is
of a type consistent with those known to be caused by exposure to
radiation" - is no less essential to defining the "condition."
The "connecting factors" are internal and not external to the events
they are supposed to connect. If these were external, the court would
not say that "a fact finder may reasonably conclude," after consistency
has been demonstrated by such connecting factors, "that the hazard caused
the condition." If the connecting factors existed independently of the
hazard and the condition, there would be no room for judicial discretion
in concluding whether there was causation, although the court would
have to decide whether the plaintiff had satisfactorily demonstrated the
existence of such independent connections. Underlying the traditional
language of the Allen formula is the admission that determining causation
is really a matter of taking a closer look at the hazard and the harm
than the court takes in considering the breach of duty and the damages.
To say that the "connecting factors" are internal is not to imply
that they are weak. On the contrary, by collapsing the divisions between
the breach and causation issues and between the causation and damages
issues, the distinction between breach and damages is undermined.
Without such a distinction, it is difficult to avoid compensating the injured
party. Yet the court in Allen not only attempted to maintain the separation
between the three issues, but split the causation issue itself into two sets
of connections. In the first category were the three specific factors listed
above: geographical proximity, probability of exposure, and injury con-
sistent with exposure to radiation. In twenty-one of the cases, these three
connections were found to have been established. The second category
required proof of additional factual connections indicating that exposure
1986]
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to fallout materially augmented the plaintiffs' risk of injury and resulted
in actual somatic injury to the plaintiffs.3'
The search for such connections was geared to "determining" whether
the hazard was a "substantial factor" in causing the harm. The connections
in the first category are actually subsumed under the second category.
If there are factors which the court considers "substantial" - such as
the location of the victim in the direct path of significant fallout from
a particular nuclear test event32 - then the causal link will be regarded
as established. Thus, the court refers to "a legally 'substantial' factor."33
Here the court's language is highly misleading. "Substantial factor" may
imply no more than an intuitive, perhaps arbitrary, judgment on the part
of the court, which seems to be the basis upon which the twenty-four
cases in Allen were ultimately determined. "Legally 'substantial' factor,"
however, connotes something more technical, substantive, even scientific;
at the very least it implies that the court is relying on some rationally
grounded standard that can be articulated in a form applicable in other
cases. This standard would be external to hazard and harm, but the court's
actual approach was to look at hazard and harm internally.
No such standard is articulated in Allen, not because the judgment
failed to engage in rigorous analysis, but because it is not possible in
principle to create such a standard. Our physical, chemical, social,
economic, and political universe is densely packed and tightly intercon-
nected. So inextricable is the web of events in which we are caught,
that to separate a cancer discovered in the 1960s from a nuclear test
held in the 1950s, or to separate a cancer discovered in the 1990s from
a nuclear accident occurring in the 1980s, would be as artificial as
separating the radioactive material hovering over Chernobyl from the
nuclear accident in the reactor below. To illustrate why this is so, some
specific causal problems in tort law are considered.
B. Some Specific Causal Problems
No case on cause in fact can aspire for inclusion in the galaxy of momentous
tort decisions of the august style. In this area the soil is too dry to sustain great
structures. 34
31 Ibid at 430.
32 Ibid at 437.
33 See, for example, ibid at 434 and 441.
34 E. J. Weinrib, "A Step Forward in Factual Causation" (1975) 38 Mod. L. Rev. 518 at
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1. Ten Cases of Causation
The following set of hypothetical situations reflects some of the
problems confronted in a wide variety of common law decisions.: Suppose
there is a drug called 'D' which is made in both liquid and tablet form
from two ingredients called 'X' and 'Y.' Every person who has ever ingested
X alone has thereafter lost his or her sight, but the incidence of blindness
after taking D is negligible. There are many companies (C1, C2, etc.)
that make and sell bottles of D (D1, D2, etc.). P is a person, a patient,
a purchaser of D, and a potential plaintiff.
CASE 1: P buys D1 from Cl and after taking it, goes blind.36
CASE 2: P buys D1 from Cl and D2 from C2, both drugs being in
tablet form. P empties the tablets into one jar, takes one tablet, and
then goes blind37
CASE 3: P buys D1 from Cl, takes the drug, and starts to go blind.
When P's sight has almost disappeared, P buys D2 from C2 and takes
it. P thereafter goes completely blind38
CASE 4: P buys D1 from Cl and D2 from C2, both drugs being in
liquid form. P pours the drugs into one jar, takes one spoonful, and
then goes blind39
35 By stripping the common law cases of shooting, fires, noise, and the like, and setting the
issues in a products liability context, these situations stress the greater socio-political significance
of the latter in a technological world. See A.C. Hutchinson, "The Many Pasts and Futures of
Enterprise Liability: 'Critical' Comments on a Priestly Tale" (April, 1985) [unpublished] at 23.
They also highlight the uncertainty inherent in the very nature of causation. It has been suggested
- incorrectly, I believe - that the second reason might be a function of the first. For example,
R.B. Lansing suggests:
These are muzzle sightings of cause that jurors are able to handle without aid from the
likes of me or you or science or anyone with fancy theories ... but wait Those were the
good old days. Things have changed, and law must change with it. Today we know that
citizens are hurt in much more secret and mysterious ways; ways that we don't understand,
ways that we can't eyeball or muzzle sight... (supra, note 1 at 24).
36 Cf McGrath v. Irving (1965), 265 N.Y.S. (2d) 378.
37 Basko v. Sterling Drug Inc, 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) is closest Cf. Oliver v. Miles
(1926), 110 So. 666; Summers v. Tice (1948), 33 Cal.2d 80; Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R 830;
Saint-Pierre v. McCarthy, [1957] Q.R. 421; Woodward v. Begbie, [1962] O.R. 60. See also Lange
v. Bennet, [1964] 1 O.R 233, where the Ontario High Court refused to apply Cook
38 Cf Connellan v. Coffey (1936), 187 A. 901; Golden v. Lerch Brothers (1938), 281 N.W.
249; Huey v. Milligan (1961), 175 N.E.2d 698.
39 Cf Corey v. Havener (1902), 65 N.E. 69; Oulighan v. Butler (1905), 75 N.E. 726; Orton
v. Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. (1918), 77 So. 632. Corey is similar to the nuisance cases of
Duke of Buccleuch v. Cowan (1866), 5 Macph. 214 (Scot.) and Lambton v. Mellish, [1894] 3 Ch.
163. See also Blair and Sumner v. Deakin (1887), 57 L.T. 522 and Michie v. Great Lakes Steel
(1974), 495 F.2d 213. CASE 4 involves a single event with two "causes" (D1 and D2 in the
text, two motorcyclists in Corey). A closely related - but distinguishable - situation arises where
two simultaneous events, each a "sufficient cause," is followed by a single "effect," as in the criminal
cases of Wilson v. State (1893), 24 S.W. 409 and People v. Lewis (1899), 57 P. 470; see also
Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc (1965), 396 S.W. 2d 609, aff'd 385 U.S. 5.
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CASE 5: P has some liquid D in a jar. P has never used this D and
cannot remember where it was purchased. P buys some D1 from Cl
and adds it to the jar. P takes a spoonful of D, and then goes blind.,0
CASE 6: P buys D1 from Cl and takes it. P starts to go blind. Hoping
to forestall the loss of sight, P goes to C2 and asks for some Y. C2
sells P some X in error, which P takes. P goes completely blind.,'
CASE 7: Cl buys its Y from C2 in sealed containers that are attached
to a pipe on its production line. C2 supplies Cl with a container that
has X instead of Y inside it. Cl does not attach this (or any) container
to the pipe when D1 is made. P buys D1 from Cl and takes it, going
blind thereafter.4
CASE 8: P buys D1 from C1, takes it, and starts to go blind. Later,
P's eyes are completely gouged out in an accident.3
CASE 9- P has a genetic condition: at age forty P will go blind. At
age thirty-nine P buys D1 from Cl and takes it. P goes blind before
P's fortieth birthday."
CASE 10: After a world-wide drought, there is a shortage of Y, and
the price of D increases to many times its usual value. P - who has
been unemployed for several months - is told by a doctor that unless
P continues taking D on a regular basis, P is likely to die. P has barely
sufficient money to buy food, and decides to stop purchasing D, dying
shortly thereafter. Actually, all the D sold by C I - P's supplier - was
40 Cf Anderson v. Minneapolis (1920), 179 N.W. 45 and Seckerson v. Sinclair (1913), 140
N.W. 239. In Cook v. Minneapolis (1898), 74 N.W. 561, the Wisconsin court, facing almost the
identical situation to that of the Minnesota court in Anderson, ibid., came to the opposite result.
Cook, ibid. was essentially overruled in KIngston v. Chicago & Northwestern Rlwy. (1927), 211
N.W. 913.
41 Cf Dillon v. Twin State Gas and Electric (1932), 163 A. 111.
42 See J.G. Fleming The Law of Torts, 5th ed. (Sydney: Law Book Co., 1977) at 174 fn.
19, and W.L. Prosser, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed. (Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1984) at 267
fn. 27. Prosser points out that this situation is suggested but not considered by Saunders System
Birmingham v. Adams (1928), 117 So. 72 and Rouleau v. Blotner(1931), 152 A. 916.
43 Cf Baker v. Willoughby, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 50 (H.L.). See also Harwood v. Wyken Colliery,
[19131 2 K.B. 158; Stene v. Evans (1958), 14 D.L.R (2d) 73; Dingle v. Associated Newspapers,
[1964] A.C. 371; Long v. Thiessen (1968), 65 W.W.R. 577; Hicks v. Cooper (1973), 41 D.L.R.
(3d) 454. Baker was distinguished by the House of Lords in Jobling v. Associated Dairies, [1981]
All E.R 752.
44 Cf Smith v. Cawdle Fen Comr, [1938] 4 All E.R 64 and Cutler v. Vauxhall Motors, [1970]
2 All E.R. 56 (C.A.).
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made without Y, and everyone who ingested any D from that batch
went blind immediately thereafter.,5
It might be argued that these cases are special in two respects. First,
they are set in a products liability context, where causal relationships
are less obvious than in most negligence situations. It is particularly
difficult to make causal statements about chemical products. Second,
CASE 2 through CASE 10 are prima facie multiple causation situations,
which are more complex than the single causation cases that comprise
the vast majority of everyday causal situations. The "regular," "everyday"
causal situations, however, are - once analyzed - no more clear and
no less complex than the ten cases presented above.
If cases lie, in varying degrees, outside the reach of "ordinary causal
concepts," they must lie along a continuum rather than in discrete realms
of easy and hard cases. 6 Moreover, the uncertainty that appears most
obvious at one extreme of this range of cases will to some extent permeate
the entire continuum. As we become more familiar with products liability
cases involving chemical products in particular, such cases will be
assimilated into the fabric of our ordinary conceptual scheme, not because
the causal links will come to appear more certain to us, but rather because
the scheme is itself indeterminate. Familiarity and indeterminacy seem
to be at the "core" of our "ordinary causal concepts."
The objection that nine of the cases are "penumbral" because they
deal with multiple causation is similarly inaccurate. The significance of
multiple causation was recognised in 1866: "Now, in this world there
are but few important effects, I take it, either in physics or in morals,
that may not be said to have been occasioned by several causes. It is
in general from a combination of causes that most great events are
produced.. . ." 7 As both the natural and social sciences unearth ever
more complex relationships between physical, psychological, cultural, and
45 This is the reverse of the "Titanic" conundrum, which runs as follows: P is injured on
D's quay while about to board the Titanic; as a result, P cannot go on the journey and (assuming
survival was impossible, which is untrue) P's life is saved as a result. The law appears to be that
D is liable for P's injury. In CASE 10, the problem of the hypothetical alternative cause (cf CASE
9) is blotted out because death prevents blindness from occurring (cf CASE 6). However, the structural
similarity between CASE 10 and the "Titanic" conundrum becomes clear when the terms 'blindness'
and 'death' are switched: P is told that P is likely to go blind if P stops taking D, and those
who take D from Cl's latest batch die immediately thereafter. The ease with which the switch
may be made demonstrates the substantive vacuousness of our notion of cause, and suggests the
plausibilty of the linguistic analysis of causation in Part IV, infra.
46 This is a reversal of Hart's idea that all cases are either easy (at the core) or penumbral.
See, for example, H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) 71
Harv. L. Rev. 593 at 607 and infra, note 72. See also Part LILA, infra.
47 Buccleuch, supra, note 39, per Lord Benholme at 232.
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economic phenomena, it becomes more and more difficult to link events
in linear causal chains.,
It might still be argued that these reflections may have scientific
relevance at the level of general causal laws, but that single causes are
legally relevant in particular concrete cases.49 The problem with this
argument is that those who insist that multiple causation presents "certain
anomalous situations" also characterize "cause in fact" as "scientific."o
Just as causal situations form a continuum from the point of view of
the uncertainty inherent in their content, so they may be placed on a
continuum according to the complexity of their structure, where com-
plexity is a function of the number of possible different causal statements
that can be made about a particular case. This number is likely to depend
more on the breadth of vision of the person making the causal statements
(and the analytical tools at her or his disposal) than on the nature of
the causal situations themselves.
2. The Simple Case
CASE 1 is the simplest case. The causal chain seems clear. In
"ordinary causal language": C 1 makes D 1, which produces P's blindness.
Stripped of such language, the formal causal chain may be expressed
as 'Cl causes D1 causes P's blindness,' where 'causes' merely expresses
a link but indicates nothing about the nature of that link. To link P's
blindness with D, however, an inference must be made. Contrast this,
for example, with the link between the eye-gouging and the accident
in CASE 8, which can be made by observation. Although in both cases
"cause" and "effect" are sequential and consistent, they are contiguous
in the latter but not the former.51 Making this inference ignores the
possibility that P's blindness flowed from some internal event (e.g. the
genetic condition in CASE 9), or some external event (e.g. something
else ingested), acting alone or together, or in combination with Dl.
Since the incidence of blindness after taking D1 is greater than
zero, but "negligible," it is difficult to pin P's blindness on D1 without
invoking a third factor. Moreover, because this is a "factual" rather than
48 As a result, the view that the universe is held together by ascertainable, linear Newtonian
forces has given way to that of a universe bound by tightly packed cement. See notes 183 and
184, infra. Cf. L Mackie, The Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
49 Cf Hart and Honor6, supra, note 12 at 10.
50 See, for example, Fleming, supra, note 42 at 170. He also refers to instances of multiple
causation as "certain anomalous situations" (ibid. at 173).
51 These terms, Humean in origin, are taken from Lansing, supra, note I at 7. See also Part
IV.A.1, infra.
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a logical inference,52 an explanation of why P's blindness should flow
from D1 would be helpful - though not conclusive - in making the
leap of faith from one to the other. One explanation is that in making
D1, C1 left out Y; since ingestion of X alone has always been followed
by blindness, we infer that P's blindness flowed from X. Yet all this
tells us is that it is rational to say that D1 caused P's blindness. And
all "rational" means in this context is that the connection is possible.
Of course it is possible that any number of phenomena led to the blindness:
for example, if P had a genetic condition that was undetected both before
and after going blind, there is no prima facie difference between CASE
1 and CASE 9. The distinction between "single" and "multiple" causation
is a very fuzzy one indeed.
Nor is CASE 1 simple insofar as the link between C1 and D1 is
concerned. Ignoring issues of Cl's legal liability, and assuming D1 is
the "cause" of P's blindness, there remains the problem of defining the
sense in which Cl is the "cause" of the D1 aberration. Is the "cause"
omitting to put Y into D1, putting X into D1, making D l in the first
place, inventing Dl, or (to shift from a deontological to a teleological
perspectives3) the reason why Dl was invented? If all the alternatives
in this list except the first and the last are removed, the last appears
highly artificial. Once the intermediate alternatives are raised, however,
it becomes apparent that the point at which we decide to break the
causal chain is quite arbitrary.
3. Multiple Causation
Let us assume that the problems involved in CASE 1 can be resolved,
and that the 'Cl causes D1 causes P's blindness' chain is unassailable.
Moreover, let us characterize Cl's conduct in this chain as tortious, and
posit a legal rule which, given the chain, imposes liability on Cl. What
are the difficulties now in determining "cause in fact" in CASE 2 through
CASE 10?
52 Logical inferences do not require - at least within the system of logic itself - any leaps
of faith. For example, a logical inference would be of the form: "p v q , - q , therefore p."
That is: if there are two events p and q, such that if one or the other always occur, but never
both (for example, night and day), and q is not happening, then p is happening. See, for example,
J.D. Carney and Ri. Scheer, Fundamentals of Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1974) ch. 9.
53 The two approaches to causation differ fundamentally. Though both are concerned with
the reason for an occurrence, deontology looks backwards at where the occurrence came from,
while teleology looks forwards to the motive, objective, or purpose of the occurrence. In ethics,
the former corresponds to rule-driven theories, the latter to utilitarian ones. See W.F. Frankena,
Ethics, 2d. ed (New Jersey. Prentice-Hall, 1973) esp. at 14-17. The minimalists I consider happen
to take a teleological approach; there is nothing about causal minimalism that precludes a
deontological approach. In the context of proximate causation, ,g., E.J. Weinrib shows how a duty
to rescue may be justified in causal minimalist terms of both a teleological and deontological
variety. See "The Case for a Duty to Rescue" (1980) 90 Yale L.J. 247. See also infra, note 168.
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Where tablets are bought from two companies as in CASE 2 there
is no empirically grounded rational basis for linking P's injury with one
rather than the other of two tortious acts. The leading decisions treat
the issue as essentially one of proof. In Cook v. Lewis, Cartwright J.
relied on the American rule in Summers, for the reason in Oliver:54 it
is easier for the defendants than the plaintiff to show who caused the
injury. Why this should be so is not clear, particularly in the hypothetical
where P put the tablets into the jar. Yet Locke J.'s dissent offers little
assistance: that the onus should be on the plaintiff to show "cause in
fact" in non-joint tortfeasor situations, but on the defendants where they
act jointly,55 may be a tenable moral proposition but does little to ease
proof of causation. One writer takes up Rand J.'s suggestion that the
defendant who did not "cause" the plaintiff's physical injury, nevertheless
did injure the plaintiff by "mudd[ying] the proof of cause."6 This may
achieve a satisfactory legal result, but it does so by positing a fourth
element (P's lack of compensation), to add to the set comprising Cl,
C2 and P's blindness, and is unable to identify two causal couplings
within the set.
The other cases also illustrate the arbitrariness of both reasoning
and result in the common law's treatment of causation. CASE 3 through
CASE 8 are examples of what Hart and Honor6 call "additional causes."57
In CASE 3 through CASE 5 the presence of "additional combinatory
causes" - because these are "sufficient" to bring about the result -
renders the "cause" associated with the defendant non-necessary. The
leading cases indicate that the defendant is liable where the "additional
cause" cannot be linked to another defendant, as in CASE 5; that both
defendants are liable where the injury appears to flow from a combination
of their separate acts, as in CASE 4; but that the first defendant is not
liable where her or his contribution to an already "caused" harm is
insignificant, as in CASE 3.58 CASE 6 and CASE 7 involve "additional
neutralizing causes."59 CASE 6 was treated as a damages issue in Dillon ,60
while CASE 7 does not appear to have been judicially resolved.6
54 Supra, note 37.
55 Cook v. Lewis, ibid. at 843.
56 Lansing, supra, note 1 at 27.
57 Supra, note 12 at 235-49.
58 Ibid at 237-39.
59 Ibid at 239-45.
60 Supra, note 41.
61 See supra, note 42.
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CASE 8, involving successive or "additional overtaking causes,"62
appears to depend on whether the accident is tortious (as in Baker) or
non-tortious (as in Jobing).3 Again, the House of Lords treated the issue
in these decisions as one of damages, without trying to determine what
harm flowed from each "cause." It might be argued that by determining
damages, the court implicitly decided the causation issue, but this
introduces circularity: to insist that there is something such as "cause
in fact" is to argue that something has been proved prior to the award
of damages on the basis of such proof. The genetic condition in CASE
9 presents the problem of an additional hypothetical or "alternative
cause."" Hypothetical causes explode the "but for" test that has been
used as the central common law test for causation: but for Dl, P would
still have lost his sight.65
4. The Bounds of "Cause in Fact"
The indeterminacy of causation is best exemplified by CASE 10,
where a plethora of scientific, political, and linguistic issues may be
exposed by peeling off the formal legal conundrum.6 Aside from the
blindness issue, it is unclear what caused P's death. It may have been
not taking D, not continuing to take D, deciding to stop purchasing D,
impecuniosity, unemployment (or the events leading to this), the increase
in the price of D, the shortage of Y, or the world-wide drought. Each
of these possibilities may be related to a number of the others but a
list of causal statements based on these questions can be formulated
in a linear causal chain, suggesting that the "cause in fact" determination
is simply a matter of fixing a cut-off point. Yet the "causal" interre-
lationships are clearly not linear. What is the cause, for example, of
P's unemployment? What is the cause of P's illness? It is conceivable
that there may be a common social "cause" underlying both these
phenomena, and that each of these phenomena have a number of other
"causes."
Now suppose that the first sentence in CASE 10 is removed. Is
there any difference between the causal determination in this truncated
CASE 10 and that in the complete CASE 10? Could the "laws of
economics," or the community's failure to counteract those "laws," count
62 Supra, note 12 at 245-49.
63 Supra, note 43.
64 Supra, note 12 at 249-53.
65 See Part ILtA and Part ILB.1, infra.
66 See supra, note 45.
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as a cause in the complete CASE 10 insofar as the shortage of Y led
to an increase in the price of D? Could the "laws of economics" also
count as a cause in the truncated CASE 10, insofar as P's shortage of
money entailed his foregoing D, or is the "cause" here the "social system"
rather than the "laws of economics"? Where does the latter end and
the former begin? Did P have the choice to choose death by starvation
instead of death by illness or does the community have a duty to rescue
P?67 The issues become even more complex when the implications of
Cl's failure to include Y in its D is considered, and particularly when
the case is turned around so that P goes blind after stopping his dosage
of D and those who take D die immediately thereafter.
If all the possible causal forces impinging upon P's death or P's
blindness were charted, using a thin line to depict each "cause" and
"effect," the resulting diagram would be a very dense web indeed; viewed
from a certain distance, this picture may in fact look like a solid blotch.
This suggests two things. First, it is inaccurate to try to slot causal situations
into a one-dimensional framework. Determining whether there is cau-
sation in a particular case is not a matter of drawing a cut-off point
at the next link in a simple causal chain, but drawing the bounds around
the nearest impinging forces in a dense causal web. Second, not only
is the process of drawing these causal bounds influenced by policy
considerations, but the very web of events itself is value-laden. Political,
social, economic, cultural, and philosophical perceptions and prejudices
are entangled and embedded within it.
It is easier to see how policy may influence the decision-making
process: clearly, we have to at least consider the reasons for P's
impecuniosity in CASE 10. The value-laden character of the events that
we posit as causes can best be understood in linguistic terms. In order
to posit such causes we have to express them in statements. It certainly
makes a difference, for example, whether we refer to a certain vague
notion we have as 'laws of economics' or 'the social system.' The linguistic
expressions we choose both are influenced by, and in turn influence,
the values that we hold and the causal decisions that we make. This
is the central idea behind the model proposed in Part IV for approaching
the issues raised by CASE 1 through CASE 10. First, however, three
other approaches to these issues are considered.
67 The issue of a duty to rescue is formally subsumed under "proximate cause," not "cause
in fact," though CASE 10 suggests that these two categories melt into each other. See also supra,
note 10. EJ. Weinrib argues in "The Case for a Duty to Rescue" supra, note 53, that such a
duty may be grounded in "a coherent and growing pattern in the common law" (at 268-79) and
in both teleological (at 279-87) and deontological (at 287-92) ethics. The model of causation
presented in Part ILA makes it unnecessary to advance such elaborate arguments for duties to
rescue (or compensate), as suggested in Part llI.B.
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Ill. THREE APPROACHES TAKEN
If a simple model can explain a great deal then it is superior to a more comprehensive
model that explains only marginally more6 s
The principle of Occam's razor values the simplicity of general
abstractions over the accuracy of complex, concrete particulars. It seems
to run counter to the very essence of legal methodology. A system
predicated on limiting the generality of universal principles in distin-
guishing cases "on the facts" would appear to have scant tolerance for
the broad strokes of Occam's razor. Yet in the tide of enthusiasm for
the law and economics approach to legal issues, the legal community
has been carried along by powerful currents of sweeping general laws,
and many of the interesting anomalies of particular fact situations have
inevitably been washed away.
Occam's razor is double sided: it can be used to shave away both
fact and policy. "Causal maximalists" wish to shave "non-factual"
considerations off the face of the causal inquiry.69 Conversely, policy
maximalists prefer to shave the causation doctrine to the bone of very
trivial contentions (only making claims about events in the external world
on the basis of completely shared sense data), if not eliminate causation
altogether.7o In this Part of the article, three uses of the razor in approaching
the issues outlined above are examined.
A. Ordinary Causal Language
Hart and Honor6's account of causation - formidable if only for
the expanse of its canvass7, - rests on a philosophical model of the
law that envisions a "core" concept of "cause" at the epicentre of a
family of related causal concepts.72 Hart and Honor6 explain that the
68 C.G. Veljankovski, The New Law and Economics" A Research Review (Oxford. SSRC Centre
for Social-legal Studies, 1982) at 20.
69 The label is Hart and Honord's: see supra, note 13. Interestingly, the rise of causal maximalism
has been explained as a reaction to the policy-based approach to causation in the nineteenth century.
See MJ. Horwitz, "The Doctrine of Objective Causation", The Politics of Law ed. D. Kairys (New
York: Pantheon, 1983). Horwitz says that "without objective causation, the problem of assigning
liability had become ... 'a concealed half-conscious battle on the question of legislative policy"'
(ibid. at 211). Of course, this policy can go either way, depending upon one's ideology.
70 See, for example, W.S. Malone, "Ruminations on Cause in Fact" (1956) 9 Stan. L. Rev.
60.
71 Cf. F.H. Newark's remark on the first edition of Causation in the Law (Oxford. Clarendon
Press, 1959): "There is no other like full-length work on one legal conception published in this
country, and the reader will pause in respectful awe at the range and depth of research which
was a preliminary to the book's making," (1960) 76 L.Q. Rev. 592.
72 See, Hart, supra, note 46. There is a striking structural similarity between Hart's model
of law and the "decriptive metaphysics" presented by P.F. Strawson in Individuals- An Essay in
Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1974), which was first published in 1959 and played
a central role in the development of Anglo-American analytical philosophy. Strawson's model
envisions a central core of human thinking that does not change, comprising the least refined
of our concepts (the domain of "descriptive" metaphysics), surrounded by a penumbra of relatively
refined concepts which are subject to change (the domain of traditional or "revisionary" metaphysics).
Not surprisingly, Strawson acknowledges his "great indebtedness to ... Professor H.L.A. Hart"
in the Preface at 3.
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"core" comprises primary and secondary "causes": the former involve
instances of impact upon the environment that can be expressed through
simple transitive verbs; the latter involve the causing of primary causes.3
This seems to indicate that "Cl caused P's blindness," an example
of a secondary change,74 forms part of the "core." Yet it could plausibly
be argued that this causal statement is "penumbral" in the model. For
example, Cl might have provided an opportunity for P to make himself
blind, and opportunities, along with explanations, reasons and general-
izations are in the penumbra. Hart and Honor6 admit that "mixed and
borderline cases" distort the model,.7 but insist that a "core" remains
distinguishable and that the imposition of liability is a function of the
particular usage of the term "cause" that is appropriate in a particular
case. The taxonomy that occupies most of Hart and Honor6's book is
primarily illustrative of the legal uses of "cause," which are determinative
in the liability decision.
This taxonomy is of little practical use without a set of legal tests
to determine whether there is "cause in fact" in any particular case.
Hart and Honor6's "core" test for causation can best be understood by
envisaging two intersecting circles: one labelled 'but for' and the other
labelled 'cause.' The common law has traditionally made use of the "but
for" test for causation.76 This is a counterfactual test which states that
event x is not regarded as the cause of event y if y would have occurred
in the absence of x. For example, the causal relation in CASE 1 might
be expressed as follows: "if P's blindness would not have occurred but
for D l being an aberration, and if D 1 would not have been an aberration
but for Cl, then Cl caused P's blindness."
In that part of the 'but for' circle not intersecting with the 'cause'
circle are analytical connections devoid of factual information and
"incidental" connections.7 Hart and Honor6 do not view these connections
73 Supra, note 12 at 28-29.
74 "DI caused P's blindness" and "Cl caused DI" also exemplify secondary changes, since
we cannot link P's blindness and D1, or D1 and C1 by transitive verbs that would express anything
more than a tautologous causal relationship (as would 'blinded').
75 Supra, note 12 at 57-59.
76 See, for example, Denning LJ.'s formulation in Cork v. Rrby Maclean, [1952] 2 All E.R.
402. One of the problems with using a counterfactual test in a legal context is that proof in law
- in contrast to proof in science - deals with actual rather than hypothetical events. See supra,
note 49 and accompanying text, and Samuel Gorovitz, "Causal Judgments and Causal Explanations"
(1965) 62 J. Phil. 695 at 709f. See also Thode, "The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case
to Determine Cause in Fact" (1968) 46 Texas L. Rev. 423, and the following comment in Allen,
supra, note 18 at 412 fln. 155: "Use of any kind of 'but-for' analysis ... to determine factual
causation is problematical at best; where likely 'causes' co-exist, it is wholly inadequate to the
task."
77 Supra, note 12 at 114-21. Cf N.K. Smith, ed., Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
(London: Macmillan, 1976) at 48ff.
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as causes, and they find fault with judges who disregard the fact that
analytic connections are "logically entailed by the description of the event
with which we start and whose cause we may seek."78 An example of
the connections that they regard as analytic is that between any assertion
about a person and the fact that she or he was born. Thus they argue
that there is no place for an injured person's birth in the set of possible
causes of that person's injury.
Nevertheless, Hart and Honor6 provide no means of determining
what counts as an analytical connection and what does not, in the
description of any event whose cause we wish to determine. They appear
to regard both the existence and the truth of analytic connections to
be self-evident. The description of a plaintiff's injury logically entails
a defendant's action just as much as it entails the fact that the plaintiff
was born. If the realm of analytic connections is broadened in this way,
then Hart and Honor6's position that these connections are without factual
content implies that all causal statements are without such content.79
Similarly, the very purpose of the "but for" test is to distinguish relevant
from "incidental" connections: it is singularly unhelpful to be told that
there are "incidental" connections that pass the "but for" test but are
not relevant connections.
In Hart and Honor6's model, that part of the 'cause' circle not
intersecting with the 'but for' circle contains reasons, opportunities,
omissions, and additional causes. Since CASE 2 through CASE 10 involve
multiple causation, the 'but for' label is irrelevant to these in the Hart
and Honor6 model. The model suggests that the "core" test for causation
is located in the intersection of the 'cause' circle with the 'but for' circle.
Within this intersection there are three types of necessary condition:8o
first, a condition that is a necessary element of a set of conditions jointly
sufficient for the consequence; second, a condition that is a necessary
element of every set of conditions jointly sufficient for the consequence;
and third, a condition that is a necessary element of every set of conditions
jointly sufficient for the consequence, but not necessary on the particular
occasion of that consequence.
Hart and Honor6's example of the first type of necessary condition
is the action of throwing a lighted cigarette into a waste-paper basket.
This acton is both a sine qua non for, and causally relevant to, the ensuing
fire. Hence this first condition might be regarded as Hart and Honor6's
78 Supra, note 12 at 115.
79 See infra, Part IV.A.2, where it is argued that all causal statements may be viewed as
analytic.
8o Supra, note 12 at 112-13.
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"core" sense of causation. Their example of the second type of condition
is the presence of oxygen, where the context of the fire does not render
this presence abnormal. This is a mere condition which is usually causally
irrelevant. In contrast, the presence of oxygen in a factory where the
manufacturing process requires the exclusion of oxygen is more than
a mere condition,81 but still appears to fall within the second of their
three categories of necessary condition. Since they cannot provide a basis
for distinguishing between the first two types of condition (apart from
a case by case contextual explanation), they are unable to define what
they mean by "causal relevance."
Yet it is the difficulty of distinguishing the first from the third type
of necessary condition that more clearly undermines Hart and Honor6's
model of causation. They illustrate the third type by describing a situation
where two people, each holding a lighted candle, simultaneously approach
escaping gas. Here Hart and Honor6 recognise that "the normal assump-
tion that on any given occasion only one sufficient cause is present may
break down."82 They dispose of this problem, however, with these rather
peculiar words:
But if, as we ordinarily assume, for every such event there is present on any given
occasion one and only one independent set of conditions sufficient to produce it,
then every member of this set will be necessary on that occasion for the occurrence
of the event and hence a condition sine qua non of it83 (emphasis partly added).
Why would we ordinarily make this assumption? In CASE 2 through
CASE 10, more than one necessary element of a sufficient set is explicitly
presented; in CASE 1, as pointed out above, alternative sets are implied.
Indeed, if all causation is multiple causation, then the first type of necessary
condition is transformed into the third, the "core" becomes the penumbra,
and Hart and Honor6's model is turned inside out.
In setting up their model on the middle ground between the causal
maximalists and minimalists, Hart and Honor6 attempt to avoid both
the formalist's claim that legal causation can be isolated and insulated
from impurities alien to the world of unadulterated fact, and the realist's
view that "cause in fact" is somehow informed by science or morality.
Thus three general propositions appear to underlie the Hart and Honor6
model: (a) that legal causation is grounded in the ordinary person's
ordinary use of language;84 (b) that scientific and philosophical models
of causation are irrelevant to the causal problems of the lawyer and
s See supra, note 12 at 11-13 and 34-41.
82 Supra, note 12 at 113.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid esp. Preface and cl. IL
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the historian;5 and (c) that legal causation can be bifurcated into factual
and policy components, and that questions of value have no bearing
on the former.86
These three propositions cannot stand together. As was pointed out
in criticism of the first edition of Causation in the Law,87 the ordinary
person's use of 'cause' invariably fuses fact and moral sentiment.8s Hart
and Honor6 view "moral blame" theories of causation as useful in throwing
"salutary light ... on those dark comers where the vagueness inherent
in the concept of cause logically permits a decision either way."89 The
incompatibility of the first and third propositions set out above is
exacerbated by the second, as the same critic goes on to suggest:
"enlightened common-sense causal appraisal, which is based on expe-
rience of an inductive character, can never be far removed from science
if it is to attempt to avoid being infected by non-causal considerations."go
Hart and Honor6's separation of ordinary language from science arises
directly out of a linguistic philosophy which, they admit, is a relic of
"the philosophy of the fifties, [and] has since become absorbed into a
wider conception of philosophy."91
85 Ib esp. at 9-13.
86 Ibid esp. ch. V.
87 Supra, note 71.
88 H. Fain, "Hart and Honor6 on Causation in the Law" (1966) 9 Inquiry 322 at 335. Surprisingly,
most responses to the first edition had little to say about the incompatibility of the three propositions
identified in the text accompanying notes 84, 85, and 86, supra. See, for example, R.D. Childres,
"Review" (1961) 32 Mississippi LJ. 222; L.K. Cooperider, "Review" (1960) 58 Michigan L.R.
951; M.P. Golding, "Causation in the Law" (1961) 59 J. Phil. 85; R. Hancock, "Review?" (1961)
6 Natural L. Forum 143; Newark, supra, note 71; and M. White, "Review" (1960) 60 Colum.
L. Rev. 1058. If critical at all, commentators took issue with the application of Hart and Honorl's
principles to particular cases. See, for example, J.H. Mansfield, "Comment" (1964), 17 Vand. L.
Rev. 487.
89 Supra, note 12 at 299-300.
90 Fain, supra, note 88 at 337. But cf a philosophical perspective in S. Gorovitz, supra, note
76 at 709-10:
Philosophers of history have often argued that historians, unlike scientists, are concerned
with unique events and thus seek a different sort of explanation. The untenability of any
such distinction has been amply enough demonstrated; every event is unique, and every
event is an instance of a type about which generalizations may be made or sought. But
perhaps a case can be made out all the same for the view that historical explanation differs
from scientific explanation. If the historian is at least in part concerned with finding the
cause of an event and if we view that concern as a desire for differentiation from a particular
standard or class of standards that is limited in some specific way, then the historian can
quite legimately be satisfied with explanations that do not meet Hempel's [scientific
explanation] standards.
91 Supra, note 12 at xxxiv. The "wider conception" to which Hart and Honord allude was
already set out well before publication of the first edition of Causation in the Law. See W.V.O.
Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), which presented
an extensive argument why sense data, language, science, and philosophy were integrated into
a single "web of belief."
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The most fundamental reason why Hart and Honor6's analysis fails
to provide a compelling account of causation is that it is rooted in a
highly dubious ontology:
The idea that individuals are primarily responsible for the harm which their actions
are sufficient to produce without the intervention of others or of extraordinary
natural events is important, not merely to law and morality, but to the preservation
of something else of great moment in human life. This is the individual's sense
of himself as a separate person whose character is manifested in such actions....
If we had to share the authorship of such changes with numerous prior agents,
of whom it could be said that, had they not acted as they did, we should not
have been able to bring about the change, we could no longer think of ourselves
as separate authors in the way we now do.... For ... there would be nothing
that we could unequivocally claim to be our doing.92 (emphasis partly added)
An attack on the ethical consequences flowing from this argument is
beyond the scope of this article; it is appropriate, however, to point out
two even more basic problems with the view expressed in the above
remarks.
First, having heard causation described by Hart and Honor6 in terms
of the three types of necessary condition outlined above, it is rather strange
to hear them speak of individuals' actions being "sufficient to produce"
a particular harm. There are two possible senses in which Hart and Honor6
may wish this claim to be understood. Clearly it does not stand up as
a descriptive statement about the world. Hart and Honor6's extensive
taxonomy of multiple causation cases like CASE 2 through CASE 10
above would be completely redundant if the actions of the individual
defendants within them could be said to be "sufficient to produce" the
harms these cases describe. Even an extreme causal maximalist admits
that "few if any acts are sufficient by themselves to produce any particular
consequence."93
Perhaps Hart and Honor6 hope in the above passage to prescribe
an ontology which - if widely held - would generate good social
behaviour. This raises the second problem. If their belief in something
"we could unequivocally claim to be our doing" is wishful thinking rather
than an expression of their understanding of how the world works, then
it appears that Hart and Honor6 are grounding their descriptive account
of causation in a body of evaluative considerations.
In short, the first problem suggests that Hart and Honor6 have failed
to escape the absolutism of causal maximalism (indeed, talk of sufficient
causes goes beyond the maximalist position), while the second problem
indicates that they are drawing on the methods of causal minimalism.
92 Supra, note 12 at Lxxx-lxxxi.
93 Supra, note 14 at 1776. Cf text accompanying infra notes 126-29.
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In attempting to defend their title to the middle ground between
maximalism and minimalism, they embrace the weaknesses of both these
approaches.94 Hart and Honor6's linguistic approach may provide a useful
analytical path, but must be integrated within, not cut off from, the
surrounding countryside that they call a "wider conception of philo-
sophy."9s Before this path is explored, the two positions that Hart and
Honor6 seek to avoid are outlined.
B. Causal Maximalism
The idea that "cause in fact" questions can be shaved clean of all
"non-objective," "non-factual" considerations is embedded in the struc-
ture of legal talk and education.96 It has been pointed out that by separating
the "factual" and "legal" functions in the adjudication of a negligence
case, "the doctrinal framework of the negligence system becomes a device
for allocating power," and entrenches the notion that these two functions
can be conceptually separated.7 Perhaps it is not surprising that con-
temporary legal theorists - in the face of an onslaught by philosophers
of social and natural science insisting that all fact is "theory laden"98
- continue to cling to a maximalist position.
Richard A. Epstein endeavors to shave all "non-factual" consid-
erations from his strict liability regime by establishing four paradigms
that capture the "ordinary usage" of 'cause' and are wholly determinative
of which party should bear the loss.99 While social and cultural interpretive
schemes render the pure factuality of the "easy" paradigms questionable,00
the difficulty with Epstein's fourth paradigm is evident from CASE 1.
Where do we draw the line with regard to C1 creating a "dangerous"
94 Cf Fish's criticism of Dworkin, supra, note 6.
95 See supra, note 91.
96 See, for example, Fleming, supra, note 42, ch. 9 (s. 2 deals with "cause-in-fact" prior to
delving into other causal issues); Prosser, supra, note 42, ch. 7 (s. 41 deals with "causation in
fact" separately from "proximate cause"); C.A. Wright and A.M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law: Case,
Notes and Materials (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), chs. 8 and 9 ("causation" is treated in a totally
separate chapter from "proximate cause").
97 R.L. Rabin, Perspectives on Tort Law (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company,
1983) at 82.
98 See, for example, P.K. Feyerabend, "On the 'Meaning' of Scientific Terms," 66 J. Phil.
266; L Lakatos & A. Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1970); T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed., (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1975); Quine, supra, note 91 and W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Massachusetts:
M.I.T. Press, 1969).
99 See supra, note 11. Epstein's four paradigms are "A hit B," "A frightened B," "A compelled
B to hit C," and "A created the dangerous condition that resulted in harm to B."
100 Consider how the meanings of 'hit,' 'frighten,' and 'compel' vary among different linguistic
communities. See infra, notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
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situation: at conclusive proof that C1 omitted Y from D1, at Cl using
X at all, or at Cl being in the business of making Dl? Clearly such
determinations are evaluative.
1. Taking Wrights Seriously
In 1948, Dean C.A. Wright wrote: "Cause and effect are pure
questions of fact. Did the defendant's conduct cause the injury...? In
not one case in a thousand is there any question that it did." toi Richard
W. Wright is still trying to support essentially the same claim.102 At first
glance, his view of causation appears to be simple, logical, and unas-
sailable. His argument runs as follows. In everyday situations, the "but
for" test is a workable proxy for determining causal relationships. In
situations like CASE 2 through CASE 10, however - which Wright
would call cases of "duplicative" and "preemptive" causationlo3 - a
more "subtle and complex" approach is required.04 This approach defines
the cause of an event not as a necessary condition for the event's occurrence
but as a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that
was itself sufficient for the event's occurrence. Wright calls this the NESS
test and sees himself picking it up where Hart and Honor6 left it,
"submerged and weakened by their attempt to treat the tortious-conduct
and proximate-cause inquiries as part of the causal inquiry."lo
Wright develops his version of the NESS test to deal with cases of
"overdetermined causation,"06 which the "but for" test is unable to
explain.lo7 Wright believes that the "but for" test works "in the vast majority
of cases,"o8 although he mentionslo9 the problem with the nature of
counterfactual inquiries which J.G. Fleming described as follows:
Another problem is that the hypothetical inquiry ... frequently fails to elicit a
confident answer, being a matter of conjecture rather than capable of direct proof.
Though factual in the sense of dependent on the evidence available, it offers a
certain latitude which may occasionally be exploited by judge or jury to introduce
101 C.A. Wright, "The Law of Torts: 1923-1947" (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 46 at 58,
102 Supra, note 14.
103 Ibid. at 1775-77.
104 Ibid at 1792. It is ironic that Wright contrasts his approach with Newtonian mechanics
and aligns it with the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. See infra, note 184.
105 Ibid at 1740.
106 Ibid. at 1775. Wright considers two types of "overdetermined causation": "preemptive
causation" where an intervening cause renders a prior "cause" impotent, and "duplicative causation"
where a concurrent cause renders another cause unnecessary.
107 See supra, note 76 and accompanying text.
108 Supra, note 14 at 1775 and 1805. Cf infra, note 184.
109 Ibid at 1776 and 1804-07.
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policy views into what is ordinarily regarded as a purely factual issue (footnote
omitted)." 0
Wright nevertheless argues that counterfactual analysis can be
insulated from value judgments. He appears to recognize two stages in
the counterfactual inquiry at which such insulation is required. First, in
"setting up the counterfactual situation," a judge may be thought to require
non-factual criteria of inclusion or exclusion.- Wright narrows the
"setting-up" process to changing "only the tortious condition,"1 implying
that this involves purely factual considerations. Yet he ignores in this
context what he argues elsewhere:,"3 that specification of the "tortious
condition" itself involves considerations of legal policy. If specifying the
"tortious condition" is not purely factual, how can changing it be purely
factual?
The second stage at which Wright senses a possible onslaught by
non-factual considerations on the counterfactual inquiry is in determining
"the hypothetical consequences of that change."1 Wright shrugs off this
problem with these words:
... in most cases there is little difficulty, for example, when the change is removing
the explosive character of a substance or the act of firing a gun. The analysis becomes
more complicated when human reactions to the changed situation must be estimated.
Again, however, the analysis is usually fairly easy and not too speculative (emphasis
added). 5
Are the "fairly easy and not too speculative" cases susceptible to
non-factual counterfactual inquiries or does Wright view speculation as
a factual enterprise? Does Wright view the breakdown of human immune
systems as part of "human reactions," and how would he factually estimate
such variables? Wright's focus on explosives and guns trivializes the nature
of counterfactual inquiries. It also fails to insulate these inquiries from
evaluative considerations. Counterfactual causal inquiries counter the
possibility of factual causal inquiries.
2. Where Wright Goes Wrong
The three stage model of causal inquiry proposed by Wright has
intuitive appeal: first, all "non-tortious possible causes" are eliminated;
110 See Fleming, supra, note 42 at 172.
111 See R.H. Cole, "Windfall and Probability: a Study of 'Cause' in Negligence Law" (1964)
52 Cal. L. Rev. 459 at 769-71.
112 Supra, note 14 at 1806.
113 Ibid at 1741-58.
114 Ibid. at 1806.
115 Ibid.
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second, the NESS test is applied to determine "actual causation"; and
finally, "reasons of policy or principle" are considered to decide legal
responsibility.116 This model is, however, susceptible to a number of attacks.
The separation of the first and third steps is artificial. Wright's enthusiasm
about the "power" of the first stepi - although barely recognized in
the literature on causation in tort law,,s - compels us to distinguish
the sort of policy considerations relevant to step one from those relevant
to step three. Wright's intimation that step one eliminates "non-tortious
possible causes" is revealing: step one presupposes that the "causes" have
already been determined. It may be argued that Wright is only talking
about "possible causes" prior to step two, but this does not break the
circularity: to identify a "possible cause" is to engage at least partially
in the sort of causal determination that Wright includes under step two.
In criticizing Hart and Honor6 for conflating steps one and three,9 Wright
fails to show why we should not collapse all three steps, as would Malone.120
The major weakness in Wright's analysis, however, is the NESS test
he prescribes for step two, which he inaccurately claims "incorporates
the traditional Humean philosophic account of the meaning of causation,
as modified by John Stuart Mil."121 Hume wholly rejected the idea of
necessary connection in the external world,122 and anyway, why is Wright
interested in Hume's account when he asserts that "both lawyers and
philosophers often conclude that this scientific or philosophic concept
of causation is of little relevance or use in the law"?'2 Hart and Honor6
understand Hume's view of necessity, noting that it "comes nearer [than
the Humean concern with whether some events occur with or without
a cause], though not very near, to the problems of the lawyer"124 (emphasis
added). They therefore use this definition as a backdrop against which
to develop their analysis of necessity which they find at the "core" of
116 Ibid at 1744.
117 Ibid at 1771-74.
Is Ibid at 1766-67.
119 Ibid at 1745.
120 Ibid at 1742-45 and 1807-13. See Part III.C.1.
121 Supra, note 14 at 1774.
122 See, for example, D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1967) at 172:
If we define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all
the objects resembling the former are placd in like relation of priority and contiguity to those
object that resemble the latter, we may easily conceive, that there is no absolute nor
metaphysical necessity ... (emphasis in source)
12 Supra, note 14 at 1776.
124 Supra, note 12 at 14. Malone observed that the "but for" test was "discredited ... by
David Hume." Supra, note 70 at 67.
[VOL 24 No. 4
Progress on the Causal Chain Gang
"ordinary causal language."125 Wright ignores the linguistic guideposts
of Hart and Honor6's account, and, in pursuit of a purely factual account
of causation, falls headlong into the trap exposed by Hume over two
centuries ago.
The NESS test is advanced by Wright as the solution to the sorts
of problems presented by CASE 2 through CASE 10 above. For example,
if D1 is a necessary element of a set of conditions sufficient for the
occurrence of P's blindness in CASE 4 and CASE 5, then D1 is a cause
of P's blindness under the NESS test, regardless of whether D2 in CASE
4, or the left-over D in the jar in CASE 5 also satisfy the test. Wright
finds Hart and Honor6's view of the NESS test too restrictive.126 Whereas
they would require proof that D1 be sufficient by itself, Wright points
to the court's requirement in Anderson,27 and Corey128 that the plaintiff
show only that the factor contributed to the injury. The question that
the NESS test does not address is how this "contribution" is to be
determined. Wright insists that this involves a "factual" determination:
"Although our judging and evaluating faculties are involved here, the
inquiry is a factual one in which we judge or evaluate on the basis
of empirically derived causal generalizations that are independent from
and not affected by the purpose of the particular causal inquiry."29
If Wright is implying here that he believes "factual" inquiries involve
values, then his entire argument is meaningless. On the other hand, if
Wright views "factual" inquiries as untouched by values, it is not clear
how "our judging and evaluative faculties" can be involved therein.
Judgment and evaluation by definition presume the existence of criteria
(either rational or intuitive) for selecting and comparing pieces of evidence.
In CASE 4 and CASE 5, for instance, a determination of what happens
to the D in the jar is entirely dependent on a choice between competing
theories of chemistry.
Wright's quoted assertion regarding the factual nature of the inquiry
into "contribution" is accompanied by the following footnote: "Although
there are undertones of epistemological skepticism in this portion of
Malone's article, I do not believe that he is arguing that there are no
real facts, or that we cannot perceive or agree on the existence of any
facts because of our subjective filtering of sense data."13o Having failed
125 Supra, note 12 at xlviii and cit V. See also supra, Part IILA.
126 Supra, note 14 at 1791-92.
127 Supra, note 40.
128 Supra, note 39.
129 Supra, note 14 at 1808-09.
130 Ibid at 1809 fn. 308. The reference to Malone's article is to supra, note 70 at 65.
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to explain what a purely factual determination would involve, Wright
resorts here to a statement of faith in "real facts" and a warning that
questioning such faith is a sure route to an underworld of "epistemological
skepticism."
Wright's argument is built around a paradox. Although he admits
that "the notion of necessity is fundamental to the concept of causation,",3,
the purpose of his NESS test is to avoid requiring proof of necessity
(demanded under the primitive "but for" test) for proof of causation.
The NESS test, however, requires proof that the "element of the sufficient
set" is itself necessary. This necessity is hardly easier to establish than
that demanded under the "but for" test. Without the construct of the
"sufficient set" interposed between the cause in question and its alleged
effect, the other elements of this "set" might be viewed as intervening,
concurrent, or other antecedent causes, and peeled away, leaving the
cause in question standing alone again. Ultimately, therefore, proof is
still required of the necessary connection between cause and effect that
Hume rejected. Wright's confusion is illustrated by the following
paragraph:
The causal question is not simply "What happened?" but rather "How did it happen?"
Since Hume, it has generally been accepted that there is no inherent causal force
or quality in objects which can be directly observed. We observe only certain
successions of events and conditions, and we infer a causal relation in a particular
succession if we believe that it instantiates an accepted causal law or generalization.
Causal generalizations, in turn, incorporate the notion of necessary conditions.
Thus, as legal and nonlegal philosophers have noted, the necessary condition criterion
and its implicit counterfactual assertions are part of the very meaning of causation. 132
This passage makes complete sense until its penultimate sentence. Indeed,
the last two sentences completely contradict what goes before. How can
"causal generalizations.., incorporate the notion of necessary conditions"
when we have to "infer a causal relation" where "we believe" such a
generalization is instantiated?
Trying to establish necessary connections, apart from its lack of
philosophical support, is highly problematic. Unless we embrace a
deterministic vision of the word,,33 we must admit that as we look forward
131 Ibid at 1803.
132 Ibid at 1803-04.
133 Cf Lansing supra, note 1 at 31. The literature on determinism is voluminous, most
philosophers fighting for the middle ground between absolute free will and absolute determinism.
An account in the same tradition as Hart and Honord's "ordinary language" approach is J.L. Austin's
"Ifs and Cans," Proceedings of the British Academy, 1956. Perhaps the problem with determinism
is most cogently summed up in the old limerick:
There was a young man who said: "Damn!
It grieves me to think that I am
Predestined to move
In a circumscribed groove
In fact, not a bus, but a tram."
[VOL 24 No. 4
Progress on the Causal Chain Gang
everything is possible. If any "effect" could flow from a given "cause,"
no particular effect flows necessarily from that "cause." The lawyer may
say that this is irrelevant because she or he has the benefit of hindsight;
but this itself is a contingent phenomenon, and does not make the causal
link more necessary. Once it is accepted that there is no necessary "cause
in fact" it is difficult to see how "cause in fact" is possible at all.
3. Wright on Risk
The final part of Wright's article deals with problems on what he
calls "the frontiers of tort liability.",34 His analysis here is particularly
instructive, as it requires him to venture out into territory where the
impossibility of a purely factual account of causation is most blatant.
It also reveals him in a desperate effort to shield such an account from
the obvious implications of the sort of causal situations described in Part
II.A above.
Wright begins by considering cases where a plaintiff can prove that
the defendant's conduct increased the risk of the occurrence of injury
or reduced the chance of avoidance of the injury. He argues that the
question of protecting the plaintiff's interest in not being exposed to any
particular risk135 or in having the chance to avoid injury from such a
risk136 is a matter of legal policy. Once this issue has been settled, the
purely factual question of the impact of the defendant's conduct on the
plaintiffs legally protected interest must be addressed.
A little scrutiny, however, indicates that this argument is far from
compelling. What is involved in determining the impact of a hazard
on a harm? Wright speaks of whether the hazard "more likely than
not" contributed to the harm.,37 Yet the only way to assess the hazard's
contribution is by examining the hazard and the harm: the causal
connection is not external to what it connects.38 The decision of what
evidence about the hazard and the harm is relevant to the "contribution"
involves a process of selection, which in turn requires a set of evaluative
criteria. In short, the factuality of the second issue in Wright's increased-
134 Supra, note 14 at 1813-26.
135 Ibid at 1814. Wright does not exlicitly explain the increased-risk cases in this way, but
implies that their treatment is similar to that of the reduced-chance cases. Wright no doubt dismisses
the increased-risk cases so summarily because he believes that their factual dimension is obvious.
It is far from clear, however, that judgments like McGhee v. National Coal Board (infra, note 149)
- which Wright regards as illustrative of the increased-risk causal determinations (Wright, ibid
at fn. 336) - can be said to involve any factual inquiries at all. See infra, Part Ill. C.2.
136 Wright, ibid at 1815.
137 Ibid at 1814.
138 See supra, Part ILA.
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risk and reduced-chance cases is an illusion because evidence cannot
be selected on the basis of pure facts alone.
Wright distinguishes increased-risk and reduced-chance cases from
what he calls alternative-causation cases. The former sorts of cases are
not different in kind from - and cannot be insulated from the problems
of - the latter. Interestingly, the distinction is collapsed in Wright's
resolution of the decisions in the alternative-causation cases.139 Wright
is bothered by the imposition of liability in the DES cases140 on the basis
of causation of a certain proportion of injuries, particularly because a
proration of the damages among the defendants who happen to be joined
results in ".... only a very rough correlation between the injuries actually
caused in the aggregate by a particular firm and those for which it is
held liable under the probabilistic market-share approach"4, (emphasis
added).
Wright's move is to view these cases as imposing liability for "a
new legal injury: tortious exposure to a risk that possibly led to a
subsequent injury."142 Presumably Wright sees room for two "cause in
fact" determinations here: did the defendant cause the risk-exposure and
did the risk-exposure possibly lead to the injury? This shows the internal
nature of causation even more clearly than the increased-risk and reduced-
chance cases. Moreover, the need for evaluative considerations in ex-
amining the hazard and harm is just as pressing here. Wright's attempt
to forestall the entry of probability into his realm of pure "cause in fact"
actually facilitates this entry via the new tort he creates. We now need
probability not only to resolve whether a particular hazard caused a
particular harm; the terms 'risk-exposure' and 'possibly lead' each clearly
import an explicit use of probability into causal determinations.
Wright concludes his discussion of risk with some comments on
the distinction between plausible "causal explanations" and "mere pro-
babilistic statements."4, He views probabilistic statements based on causal
generalizations as helpful in adjudicating among rival causal explanations,
although he refuses to allow the former to replace the latter. "Naked
statistical data," on the other hand, have no place at all in Wright's
causal determinations.,,, What appears to distinguish admissible prob-
139 Supra, note 14 at 1820 fn. 353.
140 Wright deals in particular with Sinde!! v. Abbott Labs (1980), 26 Cal. 3d 588 (Cal. S.C.)
cert denied (1980), 449 U.S. 912.
141 Supra, note 14 at 1819.
142 Ibid at 1819-20.
143 Ibid at 1821-26.
144 This is Wright's general thesis on pure statistical data whose usefulness, he believes, is
confined to mere betting. Wright admits, however, that statistical evidence may be the basis for
a causal determination where it "is so compelling that it precludes any possible alternative
explanation." Ibid at 1826.
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abilistic statements from inadmissible statistical data is the association
of the former with "particularistic evidence" that supplies the "attributive
element" Wright believes is essential to causation.
In the Chernobyl example, "particularistic evidence" would arise
out of our ability to track particles of iodine- 131 from the nuclear reactor
to the skies above Chernobyl, or to rainwater in Ottawa. An example
of "naked statistical data" might be the number of particles of iodine-
131 emitted by the reactor per second as compared with background
levels of the substance in the various locations under consideration. Yet
the "particularistic evidence" could conceivably depend upon statistical
evidence. While Wright rejects the view that "all evidence, whether it
is 'particularistic' empirical data or pure statistics, is ultimately probab-
ilistic,"14 he provides no account of what evidence devoid of probabilistic
content would look like, or how it would be gathered.
Wright's argument for the essentiality of an "attributive element"
in causal explanations is ultimately reducible to his normative preoc-
cupation with a system of liability "based on individual responsibility."146
A probabilistic view of causation threatens to blur the bounds of individual
responsibility by attributing causation to wider segments of the community,
or even the community as a whole. Yet it is ironic that the maximalist
Wright should base his treatment of causation on the very evaluative
considerations he wants to shield that treatment from. A further irony
is that the probabilistic approach he seeks to avoid may be viewed, not
as a form of causal minimalism, but as a prime challenger to the NESS
test's title as the dominant account of causal maximalism.4, However
probability is characterized, it considerably reduces the distance between
causal maximalism and minimalism.
C. Causal Minimalism
Dissatisfaction with the myth that causation can be separated into
fact and policy components is not confined to radical legal policy theorists:
no less a bastion of formalism than the House of Lords did "violence
145 Ibid at 1822.
146 Ibid at 1822 and 1827.
147 Hart and Honor6 argue that Calabresi's probabilistic theory of causation (see Calabresi,
infra, note 169) while it may appear to differ from the minimalist approach of the other law and
economics theorists, is essentially a form of causal minimalism. Supra, note 12 at lxxi-lxxiii. While
a probability theorist may be a utilitarian, however, he may not want to deny the pure factuality
of probability (though of course there might be no such thing as purely factual probability); thus,
a probability theorist may at least aspire to causal maximalism.
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to this neat bifurcation"1,8 in the McGhee decision.149 Although the
defendant's employee could not show that his dermatitis would not have
occurred "but for" the absence of showering facilities at his place of
employment, it was held that the causation requirement was met. This
result was reached by applying tests of "increased risk" and "material
contribution."iso These relative tests were formulated in response to cases
where the "but for" test appeared clearly inappropriate to the courts
concerned. Leon Green insisted that such tests are factual, but somehow
cannot be further analyzed.1s' Yet these tests also reflect the willingness
of the courts to explicitly introduce "non-factual" considerations into
the making of causal decisions. As Judge Learned Hand put it: "the
single tortfeasor cannot be allowed to escape through the meshes of
a logical net. He is a wrongdoer, let him unravel the casuistries resulting
from his wrong."s52
The crucial difference between the "but for" test or the NESS test,
on one hand, and the "increased risk" test, "material contribution" test
or "substantial factor" test, on the other, is linguistic. Under the former
tests, which are absolute, the causal universe in CASE 1 comprises two
discrete compartments - 'D is a cause' and 'D is not a cause' - and
it is a logical impossibility for D to be in both or neither compartment.
The latter tests are relative: the language of McGhee and Green implies
a continuum running between 'D is a cause' and 'D is not a cause.'
Of course, relative tests are open to the attack that their terms are
indefinable and their results indeterminable.153 Green's response would
not be to provide a precise definition of the terms in his test, nor a
set of rules for the determination of particular cases, but rather to say
that if this criticism is true of causation, it is also true of (but does not
and should not prevent us from applying) other legal tests.,54
148 See Weinrib, supra, note 34 at 529.
149 McGhee v. National Coal Board, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008 (H.L.).
150 These tests are similar to the "substantial factor" test in Bonnington Castings v. Wardlaw,
[1956] 1 All E.R. 615 (H.L.).
151 See L. Green, "The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law" (1962) 60 Mich. L. Rev.
543. Wright points out that this is the position of the later Green; in his earlier writings Green
viewed the "substantial factor" formula as the repository of substantive causal content. See supra,
note 14 at 1784.
152 Navigazione Libera T.S.A. v. Newton Creek Towing Co. (1938), 98 F.2d 694 at 697 (2d
Cir.).
153 See, for example, Hart and Honor6, supra, note 12, ch. IV, on L. Green's "modem approach."
See also Lansing, supra, note 1 at 16: "that substantial factor test leads to mu ... Japanese word
meaning roughly 'not answerable' - neither yes, nor no."
154 Green gives the example of "reasonableness" tests. See supra, note 151 at 570-71.
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1. The Pervasiveness of Evaluative Considerations
Wex S. Malone appears to bridge the gap between the "absolute"
and "relative" approaches by arguing that "factual" causation is sus-
ceptible to considerations of legal policy. Recognising the failure of the
"but for" test to "afford even an approximate expression of the minimal
requirement for imposing legal liability," Malone says it "has a marked
peculiarity which recommends it strongly for legal usage ... it is not
self-executing."55 In Malone's view, the judge brings evaluative faculties
to bear in first-order "conjecture" and - given the procedural devices
of nonsuits, directed verdicts, and appeals - in second-order "conjecture
upon the very process of conjecture itself."1s6
In this process of conduct valuation, Malone finds language a very
effective tool. Whereas Hart and Honor6 view language as given -
a starting point for judges, lawyers, and legal theorists - Malone's model
of judicial decision-making accords language the status of co-conspirator
with the judge, lawyer, and legal theorist who seek a legal formula in
which to express a policy-based decision:
The permissible range for conjecture is unlimited. We can never be absolutely
certain that our estimate is correct. The point at which we might be satisfied
can be expressed in many ways, such as "barely possible," "possible," "not unlikely,"
"as possible as not," "probable," "highly probable," or "virtually certain." Language
is very rich for this purpose and demands but a minimum of commitment on our
part5 7 (emphasis added)
Malone, unlike Hart and Honor6 and Wright, recognises that "cause itself
is not a fact and must necessarily be an inference drawn from data...,"158
and that the process of drawing this inference is informed by the
"paradigm" of the judge.s9 This recognition avoids the problem of proving
necessary causal relations, which faces the two approaches discussed
above. Malone's account, however, presents a number of its own problems.
The first problem, Malone's distribution of the power to make causal
determinations between judge and jury,16o does not inevitably flow from
his theory of causation. Alternatives to this distribution are explored in
155 Supra, note 70 at 67.
156 Ibid at 68. For example, if Cl and C2 in CASE 2 were shown to be wrongdoers, and
particularly if they were in violation of an especially "exacting" rule protecting against hazardous
accidents, judicial policy considerations might lead to the decision that both Cl and C2 caused
P's blindness. Malone discusses (ibid. at 84) Summers v. Tice, supra, note 37. The distinction between
more and less innocent instruments of harm has been questioned by Rabin, supra, note 97 at 107.
157 Supra, note 70 at 67.
158 Ibid at 69.
159 See ibid at 62-64. I use 'paradigm' loosely to describe the composite of prejudices, ideas,
beliefs, emotions, experiences, etc., which determine the "world view" of a judge. Cf generally
Kuhn, supra, note 98 and infra, note 196.
160 Supra, note 70 at 98-99.
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Part IV of this article. The second problem is more fundamental: if "cause
in fact" is emptied of the notion of "necessity" and its accompanying
tests, what are the legal standards for making causal decisions? Does
Malone's causal minimalism inevitably degenerate into causal anarchy?
Finally, the third and most fundamental problem concerns what it means
to be a causal minimalist. If causation has no factual content, then to
what does the judge apply her or his evaluative faculties in "conjecture"?
This problem is considered below.
2. Clinging to Factual Causation
Among those who view "factual" causation as tied to considerations
of legal policy, there is a good deal of confusion regarding the formal
character of this relationship. This is quite separate from substantive
disagreements over the policy considerations themselves. The starting
point of the causal minimalist is often the inadequacy of the "but for"
test.16 One comment on the Baker case,62 for example, concludes:
It is particularly in this context of the liability of the first tortfeasor in the case
of successive torts that the inadequacies of the "but for" test are revealed -
the strictly causal test falls to the obvious demands of justice. As has been said
in a different context, logic does not always have the last word in law and when
it leads to morally unjustifiable results, moral considerations have prevailed.163
The obvious assumption underlying this statement is that there is
a logical "strictly causal test" distinct from the "demands of justice."
If this is so, the law decides that x "logically" caused y, but ignores
this decision because of another decision that y was "morally" caused
by z. Is the argument rather that x caused y but that causation must
be ignored in the interests of justice? This, however, is not causal
minimalism at all, but causal maximalism combined with a particular
approach to the "proximate cause" issue. Yet the commentator quoted
above insisted that he was "concerned here only with the causation-
in-fact inquiry."'"
This confusion is particularly evident in Ernest Weinrib's discussion
of McGhee.16 Weinrib argues that McGhee undermined the conception
of factual causation as "a non-evaluative requirement."66 Yet Weinrib
gives conflicting signals regarding his view of what McGhee accomplished,
and fails to explain whether he sees causation as permeated by policy
161 See, for example, Malone, ibid, D.M.A. Strachan, "The Scope and Application of the 'but
for' Causal Test" (1970) 33 Mod. L. Rev. 386, and Weinrib, supra, note 34.
162 Supra, note 43.
163 Strachan, supra, note 161 at 395.
'6 Ibid at 386.
'6 Supra, note 34.
166 Ibid at 533.
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or as a factual phenomenon distinct from, but coexisting with (and applied
via), such evaluative considerations.67 Wherever he and other causal
minimalists stand on this formal issue, they still face the problem of
identifying evaluative standards: either standards for applying the test
of "factual" causation, or standards for determining causation itself.
3. The Cost of Causation
Most theories of causal minimalism are teleological in character.16s
This is hardly surprising, since the causal minimalist seeks to link events
for a purpose reflecting her or his values. The following examples illustrate
the potential diversity of the values found in the causal minimalist camp,
and two ways in which considerations of cost impinge upon causal
decisions and decision making.
The law and economics approach to causation imposes liability on
x where the probability that an accident will occur if care is not taken
by x exceeds the probablility that the accident will occur even if x does
take care.169 Thus, causation is approximated by the probability variable
167 On one hand Weinrib says that "it was sensible for the court to refuse clearly to delineate
between breach of duty and causation." On the other hand, he says that McGhee "shows a high
admixture of policy in the handling of the cause in fact problem." Weinrib's reluctance to loosen
his grip on the anchor of factual causation for fear of drifting into the stormy waters of a value-
laden epistemology is evident in the following remark:
Given the existence of the cause in fact requirement, denial of its essentially value-free
nature would be as futile as attempting to prove the internal inconsistency of a tautology.
The determination of what happened is in a judicial context not in itself a process that
is infected with the higher views of policy (supra, note 34 at 530).
Viewed in isolation, this assertion would no doubt convey the impression that Weinrib is a
causal maximalist. Thus Wright lists Weinrib among "writers who rely on tests other than the
but-for test [and] treat only the most difficult overdetermined-causation cases as policy-based
exceptions to the actual causation requirement" (supra, note 14 at 1777 fl. 175). Wright also
lists Weinrib as one of the writers who accept Malone's causal minimalism (ibid at 1738 fn. 7).
Given Weinrib's equivocal language, Wright's confusion is hardly surprising.
Yet it is interesting to speculate on how Weinrib understands the term 'tautology.' In the same
article he labels the "substantial factor" test of factual causation a "tautology." Supra, note 34
at 523. If the statement "factual causation is value free" is tautologous in the same way that
"substantial factor is cause" is tautologous, then perhaps Weinrib might be willing to allow values
to permeate his realm of "factual" causation after all.
168 See supra, note 53. The value of characterizing a theory as teleological or deontological
lies in making legal scholars and practitioners aware of potential avenues toward the development
of new causal standards for achieving the same results. Thus the teleological approach noted above
can be contrasted with Epstein's rule-based standards (see supra, note 99 and accompanying text),
just as the law and economics approach to freedom of contract can be contrasted with Fried's
deontological "will theory," which leads to essentially the same results. See R.A. Posner, "Epstein's
Tort Theory: A Critique" (1979) 8 1. Leg. Stud. 457. Fried appears to be Epstein's analogue in
the law of contract. See C. Fried, Contract as Promise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
169 See, for example, G. Calabresi, "Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr." (1975) 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69; MJ. Rizzo and F.S. Arnold, "Causal Apportionment
in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory" (1980) 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399; S. Shavell, "An
Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts" (1980) 9 1 Leg. Stud.
463; and W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, "Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach" (1983)
12 J. Leg. Stud. 109.
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in Judge Learned Hand's well-known formula: ".... if the probability
be called P; the injury L; and the burden B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e. whether B is less than PL."-i0
The cost element is subsumed under 'B.'171 In order to achieve the
least-cost result, the law and economics approach uses the probability
factor in a completely different way to the causal maximalist use referred
to above.172 Causal maximalism posits a causal link because of a certain
level of probability. Law and economics uses probability as a proxy for
a causal link in order to reach a cost-effective result. Thus, one law
and economics theorist has remarked that "questions about causation
are to an important extent resolved by resort to intuitions about the justness
of applying a rule of liability."'"
Somehow this intuitive approach does not seem to square with the
precision that law and economics theorists have sought in attempting
to pin down causal relationships.,74 This suggests another of the difficulties
in the law and economics approach: how is the probability variable to
be quantified? In commenting on why there should be joint liability in
a situation like CASE 2, where one jar contained tablets made by two
companies, Posner and Landes claim: "we can analyze this type of case
using a modified Hand formula without explicitly discussing causation."'"
In short, law and economics seeks to deal with causation by avoiding
it.
A quite different set of causal minimalist values is reflected in a
"communally-based approach to death and injury."'7 The holistic meta-
physics underlying these values differentiates communalists from both
the law and economics theorists and the causal maximalists, who share
a particularistic conception of the spatio-temporal universe. A holistic
view of the physical universe is incompatible with both the "but for"
and the "substantial factor" tests, which treat events "as unique and
dichotomous rather than probabilistic and continuous."'" One way of
treating causation from a holistic perspective is to arbitrarily assign causes
and effects to each other to ensure the social results one wants to achieve,
on the basis of a Humean test for causation. Under such a treatment,
170 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. (1947), 159 F.2d 169 at 173.
'7 See A.M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law (roronto: Butterworths, 1977) at 83.
172 See supra, Part ILB.3.
'73 ShaveU, supra, note 169 at 502.
174 Landes and Posner, supra, note 169 at 122-23.
175 Ibid at 124.
176 See Hutchinson, supra, note 35 at 23.
177 Ibid at 22.
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an event must be "contiguous," "sequential," and "consistent" with its
effect to be the cause of that effect; in short, consonance of "place, time,
and type of risk" is required.,7s The problems with this treatment of
causation are examined below.,79
Since a holistic view of society is at odds with the adversarial process,
communalists argue that the practical consequence of a community's
commitment to the welfare of its members is a compensation scheme
outside the tort system.8o Like the law and economics theorists, the
communalists take cost considerations into account, but rather than
focussing on the cost of the causal decision made, they regard the cost
of making the causal decision as being determinative. Unlike the tort
system, the communalists' administrative compensation scheme does not
require an explicit verbal formula for determining causation. Apart from
its failure to account for causation, however, the problems with such
a scheme are that it does not deal with the funding of compensation
or the deterrence of hazardous behaviour. Accordingly, this minimalist
approach is ultimately no more satisfactory than the other approaches
to causation examined above, and a different type of analysis is proposed
below.
IV. STEPS TOWARD A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
A consideration of the nature of law suggests that perhaps an appropriate philosophy
of law has not been found because it has been sought in the wrong places. Theories
of jurisprudence, of the nature of man, of the nature of society, can provide no
such philosophy, for these are the very points of contention in judicial debates.
But law, whatever else it may be, is language, and perhaps in the philosophy
of language can be found a more manageable, less metaphysical subject for
discussion.' 8'
178 See Lansing, supra, note I at 10.
179 See infra, Part IV.A.l.
IS0 See, for example, A.C. Hutchinson, "Beyond No-Fault" (1985) 72 Cal. L. Rev. 755.
181 D.G. Stroup, "Law and Language: Cardozo's Jurisprudence and Wittgenstein's Philosophy"
(1984) 18 Val. U.L. Rev. 331. Though Stroup and I share this same starting point, we use the
philosophy of language route to reach very different destinations. Stroup is concerned to avoid
the arbitrariness, inconsistency, and perhaps injustice of the "absolutist" view of language implicit
in Austin's legal positivism, without committing himself to an inflexibile naturalism. He finds comfort
in the parallel between the later Wittgenstein's performative view of language (words take their
meaning from their contexts) and Cardozo's acceptance of the necessity and inevitability of judicial
legislation (legal terms take their meaning from their context of social mores). The problem with
Stroup's "contextual theory" of legal language is that it does not provide for any consistency or
predictability in the law. Stroup's judge is free to legislate the meaning of any rule, bound only
by some vague notion of "context." Far from reconciling progress and stability of the body of
the law, which is Stroup's objective, this theory explodes the possibility of their being a body of
law at all.
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In explaining the reason for their ordinary language approach to
causation, Hart and Honor6 remark:
To isolate the main features of the concepts latent in causal language, though
it certainly involves the study of the dominant trends of usage, is not to provide
a code for the use of that language: still less is it to construct rules from which
legal decisions on causal questions can be deduced.182
By stopping short of the full implications of a linguistic approach, Hart
and Honor6 fail to transcend the weaknesses of the causal maximalist
and minimalist positions they criticize. In this Part of the article, some
steps are taken toward a linguistic analysis of causation in tort law. Since
the use of causal language determines causal decisions, a linguistic analysis
ipso facto reconstructs the "rules from which legal decisions on causal
questions can be deduced," and consequently such an analysis may indeed
be able "to provide a code for the use of that language."
The primary purpose of the analysis set out below is to provide
an account of the process involved in making causal decisions. This
account acknowledges the linguistic indeterminacy of causation, which
must be grappled with in the context of a particular theory of legal
interpretation. Accordingly, the presentation of the descriptive model in
Part IV.A concludes with a discussion of the model's hermeneutical
assumptions. The linguistic analysis also has a prescriptive dimension,
and in Part IV.B the normative alternatives suggested by the descriptive
model are outlined.
A. A Descriptive Model
In spite of the subtle and sophisticated reshaping of our "ordinary"
understanding of causation - via approaches as varied as Wright's,
Posner's, and Malone's - we seem to be ultimately pulled by a
gravitational force toward Hart and Honor6's characterization of causal
language.183 From within the prevailing judicial paradigm, it may appear
182 Supra, note 12 at 3.
183 This image is perhaps more appropriate here than may first be apparent. Gravitational
forces are, after all, constructs posited to facilitate an understanding of the movement of matter
in a linear, Newtonian world. Einstein's positing of a relationship between matter and energy put
the limits of a Newtonian cosmology into perspective. Nevertheless, just as Newtonian physics
still somehow seems intuitive, Hart and Honorl's account of ordinary causal language seems to
accord with what one might feel is our "common sense" understanding of causation. See also
infra, note 192.
One might speculate on whether this is due to something inherent in the structure of the
human mind, to a social and political process of cultural conditioning, or simply to the fact that
these explanations of reality are, superficially at least, the easiest to grasp. Just as Newton's constructs
are somehow easier to grasp than Einstein's, so Strawson's descriptive metaphysics (see supra, note
72) might be more acceptable to the "ordinary person" than Quine's web of belief (see infra,
note 191 and accompanying text). Strawson would probably argue, along with Kant, that his
metaphysics seems intuitively correct because of the very conceptual structure he presents within
that metaphysics.
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that even though Hart and Honor6's approach may not be the only
approach - or even the best one - this approach is nevertheless "good
enough" for our legal purposes, just as committed Newtonians may insist
on the adequacy of their physics.18, Yet just as scientific progress required
transcending the Newtonian paradigm, so the law may well be advanced
by considering (if not accepting) approaches that differ from Hart and
Honor6's analysis of ordinary language.
A view of the world predicated on linear causal chains is inadequate
to explain the forces at work in CASE 1 through CASE 10. Clearly
we can get by with a linear universe. It seems ironic, however, that the
energy invested in legal theory by Hart and Honor6 carries us no further
than to the point of accepting that we are able to get by with the simplistic
and sometimes deceptive understanding of causation enshrined in our
"ordinary language." Underlying the model presented here is the notion
that causes can be described more accurately as strands in a multi-
dimensional web than as links in a linear chain, and the belief that a
more accurate description of causation will lead to clearer, more consistent,
and ultimately better law.
Unlike Hart and Honor6, I do not find the insulation of legal theory
from its philosophical underpinnings to be helpful: while legal cases clearly
involve particulars (which may or may not be usefully dealt with by
general principles), the critical theory in which Hart and Honor6 are
themselves engaged belongs to that realm of generalization they purport
to avoid. The analysis set out below draws on three philosophical insights:
Hume's account of causation; the distinction between analytic and
synthetic truths; and the idea that language, science, and reality are
holistically structured and interrelated.
1. Hume's Problems
Hume still turns up in most discussions of causation because the
issues he raised have not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Hume's definition
of causation requires a cause to be "contiguous," "sequential," and
184 This is Wright's view of the adequacy of the "but for" test:
Just as Newtonian mechanics serves as an adequate substitute for the more accurate and
comprehensive theories of relativity and quantum mechanics in ordinary physical situations,
the but-for test serves as an adequate substitute for the NESS test in ordinary causal situations.
In each context, however, the substitute must give way to the more accurate and comprehensive
concept when the situation is more subtle and complex (supra, note 14 at 1792).
The problem with this view is the NESS test cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
said to represent the sort of break from the "but for" test that relativity theory and quantum mechanics
made with Newtonian mechanics. Indeed, the notion of necessity - the touchstone of the "but
for" test - is essential to the NESS test. See supra, Part IILB.2. Wright is correct to view the
"but for" test "as an adequate substitute for the NESS test"; unfortunately this is precisely because
NESS is not the "more accurate and comprehensive concept" that Wright argues is suited to dealing
with "more subtle and complex" situations.
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consistent with its effect.,85 This raises two problems. The first is that
it renders any distinction between causal and accidental sequences of
events impossible. Imagine that there are two clocks alongside each other
on the mantlepiece. Suppose that clock X chimes every hour on the
hour, and clock Y chimes every hour at one second past the hour. The
first chime precedes the second; the two chimes are contiguous in space
and time; yet there is no necessary connection between these two events.
All three of Hume's criteria for a causal relation are satisfied, yet somehow
we are uncomfortable about claiming that clock X's chime causes clock
Y's chime, because the connection has no explanatory power. In fact,
our intuitive sense of causation clings desperately to the notion of necessity.
The second problem goes to the contiguous element of Hume's
account. Consider two events:186 "A hits B" is the "cause" and "B feels
pain" is the "effect." Here cause precedes effect, and the connection
between the two appears to be necessary. Yet the two events are not
contiguous, since each can be broken up into an infinite number of other
events, at mechanical, physiological, and chemical levels of analysis.
Indeed, any event can be split into more than one event by a shift in
level of analysis, and can thus be removed from contiguity with another
event. When faced with the events "A's brain emitted an electro-chemical
impulse" (component of "A hit B") and "B's brain received an electro-
chemical impulse" (component of "B feels pain"), we not only fail to
see contiguity, but we have difficulty making any more of a necessary
connection (in the internal sense of "necessary" that Hume insists upon)
than between the two clocks' chimes.
The second of these problems can be avoided by retaining the Humean
definition but shifting it to a linguistic level of analysis.1s7 Instead of
talking about the events "A hits B" and "B feels pain," we talk of the
events described by the linguistic statements 'A hits B' and 'B feels pain.'
These statements only describe the events taking place at what one might
call the social level of observation; they do not refer to events at
mechanical, physiological, chemical, or other levels. Of course, we could
adjust our linguistic statements to take such other events into account,
but then we would be describing a different causal situation.
185 See supra, note 122. For a helpful analysis of Hume's account of causation, see J. Bennett,
Locke, Berkeley and Hume: Central Themes (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1971) ch. XII.
186 This is Epstein's first paradigm, which he presents as his "simplest case of causation."
See supra, note 11 at 166 and text accompanying notes 99 and 100. If it emerges that "A hit
B" is a Pandora's box of epistemological, linguistic, and ontological problems, then clearly the
"hard" cases require a more thorough causal analysis than the causal maximalists offer.
187 See, for example, C. Taylor, "Causation" in The Enclyopaedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards
(New York. Macmillan, 1967).
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The linguistic definition of causation might therefore be framed as
follows: (a) there is some linguistic statement S1 that truly describes
an event; (b) there is another linguistic statement S2 that truly describes
another event and (c) S3 is the statement 'S1 causes S2,' such that S3
describes a linguistically true causal proposition. One might object that
this is merely hiding the causal problem in a linguistic package. It is
true that the trick here is packaging, but not merely hiding the problem.
The power of the linguistic approach lies in its creation of a self-contained
causal package purified of the chunks of cemented events that inhabit
our intellectual, social, physical, and chemical universes. This account
is plausible only to the extent that there are such things as events to
which linguistic statements refer.'88 On the other hand, since nothing can
intervene between S1 and S2 within S3, the linguistic definition avoids
the contiguity problem described above.
The linguistic definition does not, however, solve the first problem:
it is unable to quench our intuitive thirst for necessity or to distinguish
causal from accidental connections. This requires closer scrutiny of the
relationship between S1 and S2 within S3, using another philosophical
insight - the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths.
2. "Analytic" Statements
Analytical and synthetic truths have been distinguished as follows:
Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something which is (covertly)
contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does
indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment analytic,
in the other synthetic. 8 9
188 As D. Davidson remarked in "Causal Relations" (1967) 64 J. Phil. 691 at 703: "... the
assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot
make sense of much of our most common talk; or so, at any rate, I have been arguing. I do
not know any better, or further, way of showing what there is." Of course, these events may be
posits: the insistence that there must be events does not imply anything about them.
189 Kant, supra, note 77 at 48. I use Kant's distinction by way of analogy only to explain
my notion of "cause" as copula, which has nothing to do with Kant's own account of causation.
See infra, note 190. Kant did not accept Hume's definition of causation without necessity. The
two approaches are compared by A.N. Whitehead in Symbolism" Its Meaning and Effect (Capricorn,
1959) at 35ff., and by J. Bennett in Kant's Analytic (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966)
ch. 11. Kant's account appears to have two essential features. First, cause must precede effect.
In Kant's words, no "lapse of time" is needed between them; the issue is the "order of time."
Kant, ibid. at 228. This avoids the problem of finding a place for causal cement in a tightly-
bound universe. Second, there is more than an external relation of necessity between a cause and
its effect: "the effect not only succeeds upon the cause, but ... is posited through and arises out
of it." Kant, ibid. at 125. Interestingly, there appears to be a structural similarity between this
second feature of Kant's view of causation and his definition of analytic truths, although these
two notions are drawn from very different parts of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. For an excellent
analysis of Kant's treatment of causation see P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen,
1966) ch. IlL.
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Where two events (or two linguistic expressions which describe them)
are connected so that their combination - including the ontological
or linguistic connective - consists of more than the sum of the two
events or expressions, this combination is a synthetic truth or statement.
Suppose the expressions S1 and S2 are being combined. The combination
will be synthetic where S2 "lies outside" Si; thus an independent
connective, with its own content, is required to connect the two expressions.
For example, S4 is a synthetic statement where S4 = 'S2 because SI.'
The term 'because' adds something to the sum of S1 and S2, and S1
cannot therefore be said to contain S2. Moreover, S4 is true or false
as a matter of "fact," even if it is not clear how the truth values would
be determined here.
Where, on the other hand, two events or linguistic expressions are
combined so that their connective adds nothing to the sum of the two
events or expressions, the combination is an analytic truth or statement.
S3 is an analytic statement if S3 combines Si and S2 using a copula
which has no content of its own. For example, where S1 - 'a bachelor'
and S2 = 'an unmarried man,' the statement S3 is analytic where S3
= 'a bachelor is an unmarried man.' S2 is "(covertly) contained" within
S1, not observably as a matter of contingent fact, but necessarily as
a matter of linguistic decision.19o
The deep-rooted character of the tension between formalism and the conceptual scheme
envisaged by Kant may be traced back to the beginnings of formalism in America in the 1870s
by young legal philosophers who felt "deep distrust and antagonism for the a priori categories
of Kant. .. .A philosophy of law.. .which was built on Kantian... foundations must be repudiated
and cast aside." M. DeWolfe Howe, Justice Oliver Wendell Hobnes The Proving Years (Cambridge:
Belknap Press, 1951) at 151.
190 1 do not believe in analytic truths in the way Kant would have understood them. The
causal statements I am examining are only analytic in the way 'a bachelor is an unmarried man'
is analytic: as a matter of linguistic convention. Thus Quine's vehement rejection of the analytic/
synthetic distinction (see supra, note 91 at 46) does not make this juxtaposition of Kantian and
Quinean (see infra, note 191) insights altogether inappropriate. Indeed, my use of the notion of
"analyticity" probably violates Kant's own understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, though
the latter runs into serious problems. See, for example, A. Quinton, "The a priori and the Analytic,"
ProceedingsoftheAristotelian Society (1964), and D.A. Gasking, "The Analytic-Synthetic Controversy"
(1972) 50 Aust. J. Phil. Given the indeterminacy of translation (see infra, note 196), it is conceivable
that 'a bachelor is an unmarried man' might be false. Even F. Maher, who argues that "probability
is enough for the law," comes close to suggesting this: see "Words, Words, Words" (1985) 14
Melbourne U.L. Rev. 468 at 482. Like Stroup, supra, note 181,Maher draws on the later Wittgenstein's
view of meaning, and somehow manages to be a disciple of both Dworkin (Maher, ibid. at 496)
and Hart (ibid. at 507). So it is hardly surprising that after a lengthy and unfocused survey of
word usage, Maher comes to the unexplained conclusion (ibid. at 511) that: "The ideas even as
to puzzling ideas and paradoxes usually get through. Otherwise, lawyers could never talk to one
another - and we do!" One purpose of the linguistic analysis in this article is to avoid this sort
of trite escape route from formalism that Maher takes: ".... inflection, gestures, examples discussed
at length in court, are often more convincing than cold formal deduction" (ibi. at 507).
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This distinction may be applied to the linguistic definition of causation
proposed above. In S3, the term 'causes' is undefined. This copula does
not add anything to S1 and S2; it connects the two statements because
S2 is "(covertly) contained" in SI. Thus S3 is true as a matter of linguistic
convention, and is an analytic truth. If S1 = 'A hits B' and S2 = 'B
feels pain,' then S3 is an analytic statement where S3 = "A hits B' causes
'B feels pain'.' In contrast, where S4 = 'B feels pain because A hits B,'
S4 is a synthetic statement
The linguistic definition of causation - with the assistance of the
analytic-synthetic distinction - addresses the second as well as the first
Humean problem. If all causal assertions could be formulated as analytic
causal statements, causal and accidental relations could be distinguished:
from a linguistic viewpoint, the analytic statements express "necessary"
connections. This is the only role that necessity plays in the linguistic
model. But what happens to this necessity when we stumble upon another
statement that seems to require revision of $3? Just as the analytic-
synthetic distinction helped in internally structuring the linguistic package
'S3,' a third philosophical insight provides a framework for explaining
the external relationships between each such linguistic package.
3. A Web with Three Layers
If D is a masochist, we might then create S5, such that S5 = "C
hits D' causes 'D feels pleasure'.' Let us assume that 'pain' and 'pleasure'
are analytically as mutually exclusive as 'bachelor' and 'married'. S3
is entirely compatible with S5. It is also compatible with S6 = "C hits
B' causes 'B feels pleasure'.' But what about S7 = "A hits B' causes
'B feels pleasure"? Can S3 and S7 only coexist if we revise our assumption
about the mutual exclusivity of 'pain' and 'pleasure'? Of course not: all
that has to be done is to revise S3 to read "A hits B' sometimes (or
at a particular time) causes 'B feels pain'.' In fact, we continually revise
our language, body of scientific knowledge, and view of reality, as new
experiences cast doubt on the accuracy, validity, or universality of our
statements, concepts, and perceptions.
An especially powerful metaphor captures this idea that no part
of our legal or factual universe is insulated from revision when it does
not square with another part. According to this metaphor, all discourse
takes place within a web.191 It is helpful to distinguish three layers within
191 This metaphor originates from the earlier work of Quine: see supra, note 91, particularly
at 42ff., and also W.V.O. Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York: Random House,
1970). Although Quine has advanced a number of conflicting positions on various issues since
the 1940s, some unifying themes are discernable in his work. See for example, A. Reeves, "The
Foundations of Quine's Philosophy" (1976) 30 Phil. Stud. 75, and C.F. Presley, "Quine," in The
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this web: a perceptual/conceptual scheme for absorbing data from physical
and intellectual experiences (epistemological layer); a framework for using
language (linguistic layer); and a view of reality (ontological layer). These
layers are superimposed: the holism extends laterally within each layer
and vertically between layers.2 Of course, identifying each layer is merely
a means of depicting one way in which we grapple with the world. Yet
this is also true of the use of the web itself.
As the centre of the web is approached, the areas of discourse, thought,
or experience become more "fundamental": thus, mathematics would
be close to the centre of the epistemological layer of our web, and sense
data near its periphery. At first this may seem reminiscent of Hart's
metaphor of the core and penumbra, but in fact the two metaphors suggest
opposite views of the relationship between particular statements. The
web metaphor grows out of the disintegration of the distinction between
core and penumbra. The distinction between the more and less funda-
mental is one of degree; its hallmark is the absence of any sacred enclaves
whose claim to privilege is so self-evident as to assure immunity from
revision. Within this metaphor, meaning is completely relativized: removed
from a particular linguistic context, a legal statement is meaningless.
This metaphor is, therefore, a direct assault on Hart's distinction between
the easy cases at the core of legal doctrine and the indeterminacy at
the penumbra. In one senseall cases are "hard," because the metaphor
has no room for absolute truths. Insofar as every statement has meaning
in the context of a particular web, however, all cases are determinable.
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, supra, note 187. 1 have stretched Quine's web a fair distance. Although
he writes of one web only, there does seem to be support for distinguishing three layers within
this web, in his discussions on epistemology (see W.V.O. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized" in
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969)), language
(see Word and Object, supra, note 98), and ontology (see "Ontological Relativity" in Ontological
Relativity and Other Essays, ibid. The crux of the Quinean metaphor I am using is the idea that
our scientific, philosophical, legal, and linguistic worlds have to be reconstructed from within. Quine
uses Neurath's image of "a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank
while staying afloat in it"; Quine says "the philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat,"
(Word and Object, ibid. at 3). So are the linguist and the lawyer!
192 The formulation of a new relationship between energy and matter, for example, would
not only be accompanied by the revision of some "fundamental" concepts in physics, but also
by a shift in the way we perceive the universe, and in our use of words such as 'energy.' Einstein's
insight is particularly appropriate here because his vision was one of holistic relativism:
... the great paper ... "The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies" . .. goes on ... to a
postscript saying energy and mass are equivalent.... To us it is remarkable that the first
account of relativity should instantly entail a practical and devastating prediction for atomic
physics. To Einstein, it is simply a part of drawing the world together, like Newton and
all scientific thinkers, he was in a deep sense a unitarian (Bronowski, supra, note 24 at
254).
The model presented in this article might be viewed as an attempt to replace the linear Newtonian
chains of the causal maximalists with a holistic and relativistic causal web.
1006 [VOL. 24 No. 4
Progress on the Causal Chain Gang
Although this analysis is confined to the problem of causation, the
web metaphor is useful in analyzing any field of discourse. A web is
comprised of nodes and strands. The nodes are posits. In the ontological
layer of our causal web, we might posit S3 to describe the causal link
between two events described by S1 and S2. Other nodes like S5, S6,
and S7 coexist with S3 in this web. The strands that link them are the
causal cement of our ontological universe. The strands of each layer
- unlike the posited nodes - are without content; their function is
simply to link the posits.193 The nodes, on the other hand, are filled with
all the meaning their positer gives them. Viewing a causal statement
as a 'posit' does not belittle its importance94 Unlike 'SI' and 'S2,' 'cause'
is not a true description of any posited event: it is merely a linguistic
device for linking 'SI' and 'S2.' Without this device, our language -
and our law - would be unmanageable.
Of course there are important differences between 'is' and 'cause'
in their roles as connectives, but these are irrelevant here. The analogy
between the two serves to emphasize both the vacuousness of the concept
"cause in fact" and the utility of the linguistic term 'cause.' In some
contexts we could do without 'is',95 but this would be very limiting.
Similarly, if there exist cases of absolute liability where the causal
requirement is waived, we might manage with 'SI' and 'S2' and without
'cause'; for the rest of tort law as we understand it, the connective is
a very useful device. Since there is nothing except a copula linking 'SI'
and 'S2' within S3, S3 is an analytic statement. Moreover, the posited
events, descriptions, and statements do not exist in isolation; they are
part of the ontological, epistemological, and linguistic layers of our causal
webs in a way that will be explored below.
193 There is no compelling reason why what Quine calls "considerations of equilibrium" (supra,
note 91 at 43) should have any content. It has been suggested that "logical analysis must yield
jurisdiction to psychology, psychoanalysis or some allied discipline" in explaining "the mechanism
[of determining position within the web] that is passed over by the metaphor": W.R. Bishin and
C.D. Stone, Law, Language and Ethics (New York: The Foundation Press, 1972) at 332. Perhaps
in creating that metaphor, Quine did paint over psychological processes with the brush of logic.
Yet if we view our causal statements as the nodes in our ontological (and linguistic) webs, there
is no need for a psychological account of the links between them, provided that we can account
for how these statements come to occupy and shift their positions. The model presented in this
article locates this "psychological" process at the level of the epistemological web, and thus avoids
reducing causation to "the clash between [a person's] desires and the social and personal forces
that are working to manipulate them and bring them under control," which Bishin and Stone see
at the root of the coherence theory of meaning (ibid at 345).
194 As Quine points out "To call a posit a posit is not to patronize it" (supra, note 98 at
22).
195 Quine's article "On What There Is" in Quine, supra, note 91, is still useful in explaining
the implications of 'is' as copula.
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4. Causal Posits
One of the implications of a holistic relativism is that not everyone
shares the same web.196 The causal posits enable individual participants
in the legal process to bridge the "communication gap" by using linguistic
packages such as S3. How do these posits deal with CASE 1 through
CASE 10? By shifting from events through descriptions to a linguistic
package such as S3, causal rules can be formulated to deal with each
of the fact situations in these cases. Such rules would spell out where
the law recognises and where it does not recognise causation. For example,
CASE 1 could be formulated as a linguistic package looking something
like this:
S3 indicates (or does not indicate) a causal relation where:
S3 = 'S1 causes S2';
S1 = 'Cl makes D1 from X and Y, where every person who has ever ingested
X alone thereafter goes blind'; and
S2 = 'P buys DI from C1 and ingests it, and thereafter P goes blind.'
This is a highly specific rule for CASE 1. The specificity of the
linguistic rules formulated will depend on the cost of refining the law,
the degree of refinement a community can afford, and the relative
advantages and disadvantages of more or less specificity. S1 and S2,
for example, might be reformulated for CASE 1 as follows:
$3.1 = 'S1.1 causes S2.1';
SI.1 = 'Cl produces D1, where X, a component of DI, has been followed by
a certain incidence of a certain injury, I'; and
S2.1 = 'P suffers injury I after being exposed to Dl.'
The increased generality here is more than formal. Under S3.1, for instance,
the law recognises a causal relationship where P obtains D1 made by
an untraceable manufacturer. S3.1 applies equally to drugs manufactured,
to radiation emitted from nuclear tests, and to bullets discharged from
a hunter's gun. 'DI' is merely a variable that can take on any value
that accords with the linguistic context provided by the three statements.
CASE 2 through CASE 9 would be similarly (and more easily) defined,
196 For Kuhn, a single set of webs would be shared by a "scientific community." See Kuhn,
supra, note 98 at 176ff. When communication breaks down, people should "recognize each other
as members of different language communities and then become translators." Ibid at 202. Quine
has shown that translation between speech communities is indeterminate. See "Ontological
Relativity," supra, note 191 and Word and Object, supra, note 98, ch. II. He puts this down to
the inscrutability of reference itself rather than epistemological, cultural, or political differences:
One frequently hears it urged that deep differences of language carry with them ultimate
differences in the way one thinks, or looks upon the world. I would urge that what is most
generally involved is indeterminacy of translation (ibid at 77).
By using 'cause' only as a copula, we minimize its field of reference, and thus lessen the impact
of the inscrutability problem. Viewed in this way, the model presented in this article is a translation
manual that helps one to cope with the indeterminacy of translation.
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since they would be multiple causation extensions of S3 in CASE 1,
capable of application to all other similarly structured linguistic des-
criptions. For example, in CASE 2, S1 and S2 could be formulated by
using $1.1 and S2.1 to describe the more complex situation:
SI(CASE 2) ='SI.I(CASE 1) is true of Cl and C2'; and
S2(CASE 2) = 'S2.1(CASE 1) is true of P where D is substituted for D1 and
P cannot know whether he was exposed to Dl or D2.'
CASE 10 shows clearly how the selection of S1 and S2 may not
only determine the causal relationships, but also redefine the case itself
in a myriad of different ways. There should be nothing surprising about
this: it is generally accepted that lawyers and judges are faced with the
problem of drawing the bounds of relevance in every case they deal
with. The power of the linguistic model is in exposing this process in
its pristine form. One way of formulating a rule for CASE 10 might
be as follows:
S1(CASE 10) = 'P is unemployed and has barely sufficient money to cover daily
expenses'; and
S2(CASE 10) = 'P decides to cease purchasing D and dies shortly thereafter, where
P's doctor warned P that if P ceased the dosage of D, then P would be likely
to die.'
By excluding the drought, the shortage of Y, the price increase in D,
and the blindness factor from this rule, the lawmaker has decided -
on the basis of a certain set of social policies - that a certain chunk
of the causal web is relevant. This decision can only be implemented
through the lawmaker's use of language. A minor modification of S1
(CASE 10) makes this clear:
SI.l(CASE 10) = 'P has barely sufficient money to cover daily expenses.'
Removal of the term 'unemployed' indicates a decision to broaden the
net of community responsibility. Suppose this rule were formulated in
a full-employment community that had no term in its vocabulary roughly
translatable into 'unemployed.' Such a community would be unable to
formulate SI(CASE 10) and hence to make the policy distinction between
SI(CASE 10) and SI.I(CASE 10). For this reason the process of drawing
the bounds of relevance within a causal web is determined by both
language and policy, just as the web itself consists of both statements
and values.197
197 In all ten cases presented in Part ll.B.1, causation has a temporal dimension. The temporal
succession of events is one of the basic elements of our Humean starting point. The linguistic
model does not ignore the temporal dimension, but treats it metaphorically in spatial terms. While
the three layers are general analytical constructs that could be applied to any legal problem, when
applied to causation they form the layers of a web of causation. Just as the analytical constructs
are metaphorical, so is the web of causation: it depicts part-spatial and part-temporal causal
relationships in purely spatial terms.
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5. Judging Causation
Every tort case must involve causation as an issue, although in many
cases this issue is not articulated. The steps that a judge takes in
approaching this issue can be linked to the layers of a causal web.98
The three steps are logical, not chronological: they overlap and can occur
concurrently.
First the judge "hears the evidence." Suppose an action is brought
in damages for a new tort labelled "inflicting a feeling of pain." The
plaintiff (B) brings two events before the court as pieces of evidence.
El = A hit B, and E2 = B felt pain. The judge absorbs El and E2
as pieces of knowledge; in the terms of our metaphor, the judge posits
El and E2 as nodes in the epistemological layer of her or his causal
web. As new pieces of evidence are posited (for example, the defendant
(A) may bring into the web E3 = B felt pleasure), the content and
positioning of the current nodes may be adjusted and some posits may
be thrown out of the web altogether.
The strands that link these nodes together consist of a crude, intuitive
notion of "cause." If causation is not raised explicitly as an issue in
the case, then these strands may not be articulated. Thus, the plaintiff
alleges El and E2, and defendant asserts E3, without either party talking
about whether El caused E2 or E3. In this situation, the "trier of fact"
is asked to determine the truth values of E2 and E3, but she or he
cannot conceptualize the problem without using an intuitive notion of
"caused." If, on the other hand, the defendant argues that El could not
have "caused' E2 because it caused E3, the judge is presented with an
explicitly causal issue. Again the judge will first draw on her or his
unrefined sense of causation in "hearing the evidence."
The second step occurs when the judge "formulates the facts." This
step begins as soon as the judge starts to assimilate a web into which
the "facts" of all the cases she or he hears will be integrated, and this
coincides with her or his learning of language itself.,99 It is to this step
that the linguistic modification of Hume's definition of causation is
addressed. From the point of view of causation this is the crucial step,
for although step one delineates the universe from which the judge selects
the building blocks for her or his causal reality, this universe is potentially
infinite, and step two is the selection process. Two or more events are
198 This account may be applied to cases other than those on causation.
199 Perhaps the most fundamental question of linguistic philosophy is that of how language
is learned. if this can be explained, a complete epistemology should flow from it. For example,
Quine's Word and Object, supra, note 98, might be viewed as an account of learning to talk. See
especially pp. 5-8, 10-17, 80-85, and 105-10.
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selected from all the evidence. The articulation of these events requires
a set of linguistic labels. By selecting E1 and E2, the judge automatically
pastes the labels S1 and S2 onto the body of evidence before the court.
In the metaphor, the judge is positing S1 and S2 as nodes in the linguistic
layer of her or his casual web.
"Formulating the facts" is an ongoing process, and as the content
and structure of the epistemological layer evolves, there are corresponding
changes in its linguistic counterpart. The crucial difference between these
two layers lies in their treatment of causation. While the epistemological
layer is bound together by some unrefined notion of "cause," the strands
in the linguistic layer consist of a completely refined, but undefined term:
'cause.' A judge listening to or thinking about the evidence understands
the causal relationships linking this evidence together in a particular (if
unclear) way. This understanding of "cause" may, however, be slightly
or entirely different from that of other people. When judges have to
communicate their view of the evidence, they need a bridge between
themselves and their listeners or readers. Just as it links the linguistic
nodes, so the term 'cause' provides this bridge. The judges may mean
something quite substantive when using this term; but they will not be
referring to anything more than the emptiness inside the shell of this
formal copula.200
The act of linking S1 and S2, the linguistic descriptions of the selected
pieces of evidence before the court, takes the judge to the third and
final step: "making a causal judgment." This judgment is expressed in
linguistic terms, but involves the judge in nothing less than the creation
of her or his causal reality. To complete the metaphor, she or he posits
S3 (the statement 'Si causes S2') as a node in the ontological layer of
her or his causal web. The judge's ontology will change whenever shifts
occur in the epistemological and linguistic layers. The ontological layer
also changes internally, which means that the other two layers must adjust
to it. Suppose, for example, that a number of posits accumulate in the
judge's ontology: S3, S4, S5, and so on. Each of these causal statements
has its own underlying linguistic components which in turn are descriptions
of events brought as evidence before the court. If S5 is incompatible
with S3 then one or both must be adjusted or rejected.
200 'Mean' and 'refer' here correspond roughly to Frege's distinction between "sense" and
"reference." See "On Sense and Reference," in P. Geach and M. Black, eds., Translations from
the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (1972). The semantic meaning or "sense" of a linguistic
term concerns the use of the term as part of a wider chunk of language. Its lexical meaning or
"reference" is what the term denotes. The distinction is fundamental and crucial, and yet easily
overlooked. P. Goodrich points out that Hart's entire model of the core and penumbra is based
upon a conflation of these two categories of meaning: "The Role of Linguistics in Legal Analysis"
(1984) 47 Mod. L. Rev. 523 at 525-26 fri. 16.
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What links S3 and S5? The strands in the ontological web comprise
the cement that binds our causal universe. This cement is what we are
referring to when we talk about causes as if they somehow exist in reality.
If the concept "cause' is knowable but unrefined, and the term 'cause'
is so refined that there is nothing to know about it, then cause itself
is completely inscrutable. If we could step outside our web and look
at it from some Archimedian vantage point then we might be able to
know what this business of causation is all about. Because we must rebuild
this web from within, we have to be satisfied with using our limited
linguistic tools to transform the causal links we perceive into our causal
reality, just as a judge has to use the linguistic technique of formulating
the facts to jump from hearing the facts to making a causal judgment.
6. Linguistic Indeterminacy
What are the implications of this account of judging causation for
tort law? Suppose two judges, X and Y, hear the same evidence, El,
E2, and E3. Judge X may focus on the defendant's pain, locating S1
and S2 at the centre of her or his linguistic web, and relegating the
statement 'B feels pleasure' to the periphery. Thus S3 (the statement
"A hits B' causes 'B feels pain") will be at the centre of judge X's
ontology, and S5 (the statement "A hits B' causes 'B feels pleasure")
will be at the periphery. S3 and S5 are not inconsistent, but in making
the causal judgment, judge X has to extract from the ontology a particular
chunk of causal reality. Judge X extracts S3 and holds plaintiff liable
for the tort of "inflicting a feeling of pain" on B. Judge Y, in contrast,
locates E3 at the centre of her or his epistemology, and accords the
statement 'B feels pleasure,' and hence S5, positions of priority. When
it comes to making her or his causal decision, judge Y extracts S5 from
her or his ontology and holds plaintiff not liable.
There is another, more unsettling route by means of which judges
X and Y may arrive at contradictory decisions. Suppose both judges
accorded the same weight to the evidence and the statements describing
it. The two judges may still perceive El and E2 differently, and hence
S1 and S2 may mean different things to each of them. Just as 'cause'
may mean different things for judge X and judge Y, so may the term
"hit."0o1 If 'hit' means a hard slap for judge X and a mild pat for judge
Y, judge X may posit a causal link where judge Y does not. What is
201 See supra, note 196. As Stanley Fish suggests, supra, note 6 at 554-55:
It is entirely possible that the parties to our imagined dispute might find themselves pointing
to the same "stretch of language" (no longer the same, since each would be characterizing
it differently) and claiming it as "fact" in support of opposing interpretations.
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most disturbing is that judge X and judge Y really have no way of knowing
that their fields of reference for the term 'hit' differ, because they have
no means of translating their varying usages into a commonly understood
language.02 If these judges cannot translate for each other, they cannot
translate for anyone else. Yet while one can never be sure of the precise
field of reference of someone else's language, the richer the language
available the greater the likelihood that its users' fields of reference will
overlap or even coincide. Since the indeterminacy of translation cannot
be eliminated, the best that a judge can do is to use as rich a language
as possible. The role of the lawmaker is to articulate as precisely as
possible the approximate bounds of reference for a causal ontology.
None of this should be surprising to anyone familiar with the view
that one can only understand and interpret the world through a particular
"paradigm."2o3 The key to progress under this theory is the idea that
the members of a linguistic community share the same paradigm. Glancing
at the esoteric words and arcane style that fill the volumes of most law
reports, it would appear that judges do constitute such a community.2o,
There are, however, widely varying views on the nature of this community
and the way it creates and applies the law. Most of these views fall
into one of two major camps and the clearest way to distinguish these
camps is to look at their assumptions about the nature of judging.
7. Hermeneutical Assumptions
In the first camp are the textual positivists.2o They may permit an
element of subjectivity to mediate between the judge and his statutory
or common law texts, but cling to the notion that objectively true or
good values are embedded in the paradigm of the judicial community.
Owen Fiss is one member of this camp. He calls this set of values "a
commitment to uphold and advance the rule of law itself."206 Another
textual positivist is Ronald Dworkin. He seems to recognise a plurality
202 See Quine, "Ontological Relativity" supra, note 191. Cf supra, notes 196 and 200.
203 See, for example, G.E. White, who observes the effects on legal theory of the "growing
momentum in contemporary academic life of Kuhnian logic" in "The Text, Interpretation, and
Critical Standards" (1982) 60 Texas L. Rev. 569 at 569.
204 Much attention has recently been given to the question whether judges are members of
the same community. See, for example, O.M. Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation" (1982) 34 Stan.
L. Rev. 739.
205 Textual positivism should not be confused with legal positivism. See supra, note 6.
206 Supra, note 204 at 746. As S. Levinson points out in "Law as Literature," (1982) 60
Texas L. Rev. 393 at 394-95, it is difficult "to understand Fiss' embrace of Kuhn, given that
the key element in Fiss' program is his defense of the objective truthfulness of claims about public
and constitutional values."
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of political paradigms within the judicial community, but is committed
to objectivity at least at the formal level of fitting new links to the existing
"chain of law": "an interpretation of any body or division of law, like
the law of accidents, must show the value of that body of law in political
terms by demonstrating the best principle or policy it can be taken to
serve."207
All textual positivists are committed to maintaining a separation
between what textual positivist one calls "linguistic" and "moral"
intuitions.20 While they each have different recipes for the judicial mixture
of statutory interpretation and political lawmaking, none of them question
the assumption that these two enterprises might in theory be disentangled.
Apart from its many other flaws, 209 textual positivism is unable to explain
why two judges may reach opposite causal decisions. This is because
this camp insists that "interpretation is itself an activity which is in need
of constraints" whereas actually "interpretation is a structure of constraints,
a structure which, because it is always and already in place, renders
207 "Law as Interpretation," supra, note 5 at 544-45. In responding to Fish's assault (see supra,
note 6) upon his theory of interpretation, Dworkin argues that "the question of objectivity" is
separate from the question of how interpretation takes place. See R. Dworkin, "My Reply to Stanley
Fish... : Please Don't Talk about Objectivity Any More" in WJ.T. Mitchell, ed. The Politics of
Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). He questions the value of advancing
substantive arguments for the objectivity of a particular interpretation where such arguments are
external to the interpretive theory itself (ibid at 297-303). Yet, Dworkin clings to objectivity with
respect to the formal process through which interpretations are made. Accordingly, he critcizes
Fish for "bringing an a priori theory of objectivity to the enterprise of interpretation instead of
taking it from the enterprise" (ibid at 291). Dworkin appears to accept a plurality of "best" principles
and policies for the judge to believe in, but insists that the judge nevertheless be in a position
to "make the distinctions and discriminations the right-wrong picture requires" (ibid at 290-91).
Thus the epistemological paradox that Fish identifies: ". . . Dworkin imagines a two-stage process
in which one first has a belief and then must determine whether or not to believe it:" S. Fish,
"Wrong Again" (1983) 62 Texas L. Rev. 299 at 312.
208 See M. Moore, "The Semantics of Judging" and "A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,"
supra, note 4. Moore is a good example of the common ground underlying textual positivism because
within one page (Moore, "Semantics," ibid. at 293) he manages to sound like both Hart - "... [a
judge's] obligation is to apply the statutory language and moreover, to take into account in his
decision his intuitions about what language ordinarily means" - and Dworkin: ".... [interpretation
of a statute is] an application of it to the facts of the case in a way that promotes the intention
the judge sees 'in' the statute."
For Moore, "linguistic" intuitions are "provisional," setting the bounds within which the judge
invokes his "moral intuitions." Thus there is, in Moore's view, an inevitable trade-off between
the two. The obvious problem with this is that if a judge is necessarily - according to Moore
- influenced by moral considerations in interpreting a statute, how can this judge prevent these
considerations from infiltrating into his "linguistic intuitions"? Conversely, though perhaps less
obviously, are not one's "moral intuitions" linguistically determined? "A judge who knows the
Oxford English Dictionary by memory" may indeed "not know nearly enough to resolve cases"
because "he must know what is fair, just, and right" (Moore, "Semantics," ibid at 293). On the
other hand, a judge cannot begin to know the latter until he knows the terms 'fair,' just,' and
'right' - and at least a bit more of the Oxford Dictionary - in order to put these terms into
some linguistic context and resolve cases.
209 See, for example, Levinson, supra, note 206.
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unavailable the independent or uninterpreted text and renders unimag-
inable the independent and freely interpreting reader."2o
The second camp collapses the distinctions between interpretation
and creation, insisting that the very act of reading statutes and judgments
involves the judge in lawmaking. This is the camp of textual relativism.2,
Its approach accords with my model of how a judge deals with causation:
the very acts of "hearing the facts" and "formulating the facts" involve
positing epistemological and linguistic entities and relationships that
themselves are creative of the judge's causal reality. There is a more
fundamental reason why this model falls into the second and not the
first camp. By building into its paradigm a core of objectivity, the first
camp must allow for the possibility that judges will deviate from their
paradigms: a judge whose links do not "fit" the chain of previous decisions
is "striking out in a new direction."22 The second camp wholly rejects
this possibility:
A judge who decided a case on the basis of whether or not the defendant had
red hair would not be striking out in a new direction; he would simply not be
acting as a judge, because he could give no reasons for his decision that would
be seen as reasons by competent members of the legal community.
213
Similarly, a judge cannot step outside the collective linguistic web2l4
of the legal community because she or he would not be able to
communicate with other judges and lawyers. Such an inability to
communicate would cut short the process described above at the first
step: "formulating the facts" or "making a causal judgment" could not
210 Fish, supra, note 6 at 562. Fish insists that his approach has no normative implications
for literary criticism: "As soon as you descend from theoretical reasoning about your assumptions,
you will again inhabit them." See S. Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive
Communities (1980). Unlike Paul Brest (see "Interpretation and Interest," 34 Stan. L. Rev. 765
at 773), 1 do not think that the power of judicial interpreters should in principle limit the relevance
of Fish's approach to legal interpretation. Indeed, this power simply increases the significance of
the interpreter's "assumptions."
211 It may be argued that the division between the two camps is artificial, superficial, and
distracting. G.L. Bruns argues, for example, that "there's not much room for disagreement between
Dworkin and Fish" because they both fall onto the same side of the divide between "grammarians"
and "pragmatists": ".... how loose things get depends on whether we think of conventions
grammatically in terms of mental constraints or socially in terms of prevailing customs .. " G.L.
Bruns, "Law as Hermeneutics: A Response to Ronald Dworkin" in The Politics of Interpretation,
supra, note 207 at 317-18.
The problem with Bruns is that he sees the relation between law and its social context as
the subject-matter of legal interpretation, rather than one part of this subject-matter. Bruns avoids
the epistemological issue of how a society comes to the meaning of a text, which must be prior
to the issue of what that meaning is. Bruns correctly observes the proximity of some of Dworkin's
stances to Fish's position; this is not because they are both "grammarians," however, but because
Dworkin tries, at times, to have a foot in each of the two camps.
212 Dworkin, supra, note 5.
213 Fish, supra, note 6.
214 See supra, notes 196, 204, and 206.
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be done in any meaningful way. Textual relativism accounts for a judge's
ability to communicate causal decisions, but it does not align the content
of these decisions in any way. Even within a given paradigm the decisions
may be completely inconsistent: the content of a judge's causal decisions
depends on a selection of posits from her or his ontological web. That
selection is determined by the judge's political paradigm.2, This process
of selection is the locus of power of the judicial community, who are,
in this context, a causal chain gang.
B. Tor4 Legislation, and Beyond
"Let all laws be clear, uniform and precise: to interpret laws is almost always
to corrupt them" - Voltaire-l6
How, then, should causation be dealt with? My linguistic analysis
has to this point been concerned with providing an account of how causal
decisions are actually made in tort law. The model presented suggests
that linguistic analysis is a matter for whoever is charged with the task
of making causal decisions. There are a number of normative routes
leading from this model and there is no necessary reason why any linguistic
form should or should not constitute a causal law.
The problem of linguistic indeterminacy undermines the traditional
approach of giving the judicial community a free hand in determining
causal relationships. Although such determinations take place within the
context of linguistic and political paradigms, many judges tend to articulate
their causal decisions in the quasi-scientific guise of causal maximalism.
Accordingly, the question arises as to whether legislation can and should
constrain this power to create causal chains, by entering what has until
now been a purely common law area.
It is possible to impose a statutory framework upon the process
of judging causation. The role of the legislator would be to create a
catalogue of causal statements like S3 that cover as many as possible
of the descriptions of events that might pertain to injuries. In a cost-
free world, this would be the route to clarity and consistency; it might
also be the route to justice, insofar as "justice" reflects the political will
of the community whom, in theory at least, the legislators represent.
Legislation thus reduces linguistic indeterminacy with respect to both
the weaning of legal prescriptions and their policy underpinnings.
215 See A.C. Hutchinson, "From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction" (1984)
94 Yale W. 209, and "Alien Thoughts: A Comment on Constitutional Scholarship" (1985) 58
S. Cal. L. Rev. 701 at 711-13.
216 Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary (1764), quoted in H.L. Mencken, A New Dictionary of
Quotations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942) at 658.
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A legislature could intervene by reversing the three-step process
outlined above. It would start at the ontological level by defining the
bounds of causal reality in terms of its political mandate: a libertarian
parliament would define these bounds narrowly; a communalistic par-
liament would define them broadly. Then, shifting to the linguistic level,
the legislature would posit linguistic causal chains on the basis of its
selected causal reality. These chains would be rules in the pristine sense:
linguistic packages within which the pieces of evidence of particular
cases can be fitted. Finally, the judges would undertake the epistemological
process of fitting their perceptual and conceptual courtroom experiences
to these formal linguistic structures. At this third and final level the
indeterminacy is unavoidable: in a world of textual relativism, each judge
recreates the linguistic rule by reading it.217 This is a long way, however,
from the indeterminacy of a system of tort case ratios dealing with "cause
217 The indeterminacy involved in a judge's statutory interpretation may be no less than in
her or his interpretation of precedent. As Fish puts it: "... a statute no more announces its own
meaning than does the case to which it is to be applied, and therefore cases where statutes figure
are no more or less grounded than cases where no statutes exist" (Fish, supra, note 6 at 566
fn. 21).
The way in which the term 'apply' has been refashioned by lawyers provides a vivid example
of how linguistic usage determines one's conceptual framework. The relevant definition in The
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1973) seems to accord
with a lay, intuitive understanding of 'apply': "to bring ... a law ... into contact with facts, to
put into practical operation." This suggests that applying a statute involves a process of fusing
law and fact, and that a law derives its meaning by being "applied" to a set of facts. Yet Black's
Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1979) presents an entirely
different picture in the following "legal" definition: "When construing a statute, in describing the
class of persons, things or functions which are within its scope; as that the statute does not 'apply'
to transactions in interstate commerce." This implies that law and fact are two separate entities
with mutually exclusive and independent meanings. Either this statute is applicable to this set of
facts or it is not: whatever the judge decides, there is no further process of "applying," because
the independent meaning of the statute will indicate the result. In short, by using 'apply' in this
way, lawyers avoid confronting the hermeneutical problem altogether, much like the use of 'cause'
as copula in the linguistic model presented in this article avoids digging into the problem of causation.
One attempt to confront the 'apply' problem has been made by Moore, supra, note 4. Moore
examines the structure of a formalist's syllogism (see Moore, "Semantics," ibid. at 171), observing
that the formalist is unable to supply the "crucial third premise" to link legal predicates and factual
descriptions. He concludes that this must be created by the judge, for "it is not a legal rule" (ibid
at 172). This is consistent with his metaphysical realism and legal naturalism (see Moore, "Natural
Law," supra, note 4 at 397). Yet there is no compelling reason why the "third premise" should
not be a legal rule. Consider Moore's example:
Premises:
(1) Objects that are not manufactured products may be carried without an ICC certificate.
(2) These things are eviscerated chickens.
(3) All eviscerated chickens are not manufactured products
Conclusion: These things may be carried without an ICC certificate.
By defining manufactured products to exclude eviscerated chickens we do not need to embrace
formalism, though the formalist may, of course, also want to do this. Such a definition would,
however, allow the judge to limit the unavoidable indeterminacy of meaning without having to
fall back on a dubious essentialism and a vague notion of "moral reasoning." Of course, the
indeterminacy remains with respect to the fields of reference of 'eviscerated chickens' and
'manufactured products.'
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in fact." The inconsistency and unpredictability has been confined to
one of the three steps in the legal process, and the primary locus of
political power has been shifted from the judges to a broader political
community.
There are two general problems with this legislative route through
the tort system. Given unlimited resources, could a catalogue of permissible
causal statements be created quickly enough to cover new tort situations
that arise as both technology and society changes? This difficulty assumes
considerably less significance when one perceives the structural similarity
of causal situations, illustrated in CASE 1 through CASE 10. Society's
resources, however, are not unlimited. The costs of the legislative route
cover not a one-time effort but an ongoing process of revisions in
accordance with even subtle changes in a legislature's political mandate.
The impact of such changes is felt throughout the web. The benefits
of the process, on the other hand, involve a relative reduction of
indeterminacy, not its elimination. While this represents a considerable
advance over the purely common law approach, the costs must be weighed
against its benefits.
The second problem with the legislation of causation in tort is even
more fundamental. Because the descriptive linguistic model presented
above indicates a way to avoid the maximalists' reliance on necessity,
it may be used as the tool of a legal system endeavouring to avoid
responsibility. A legislature is free to draw the bounds of causal reality
as broadly or narrowly as it pleases - or at least as its political mandate
permits - and the linguistic causal copula will serve all such mappings
equally well. This linguistic model, however, is grounded in a view of
both epistemology and ontology as layers of a web. This implies that
both the process of observation, knowledge, and reflection, and the object
of that process are interconnected and indivisible. It makes little sense
to speak of "Nevada injuries" or "Chernobyl injuries." An injury belongs
no more and no less to Nevada or Chernobyl than to the myriad of
other physical, chemical, social, economic, and political events in which
the victim of an injury is entangled. The web of events linking continents
and decades is not easily dismantled: in making causal decisions, a
legislature is forced to dissect this web along lines that are vague or
even arbitrary.
Accordingly, the linguistic model goes beyond dispelling the notion
that particular injuries occurring after the Nevada and Chernobyl disasters
may be compensated - and others may not - on the basis of the presence
or absence of factually ascertainable "connecting factors" between harms
and hazards. It also suggests that the bounds of causation must be drawn
sufficiently broadly to ensure the compensation of all harms - and the
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prevention of all hazards218 - within the categories of harms (or hazards)
that may be compensated (or enjoined) at law. The following normative
conclusion thus flows from the descriptive linguistic model presented
above: a community should be ultimately responsible for compensating
the injuries that it determines should be compensated as a matter of
law, since within its complex and indivisible web of causation, the
community must recognise itself as the cause of those injuries.
The tort system serves as a practical framework for awarding
compensation, and at the same time provides a direct mechanism for
funding such compensation and deterring hazardous behaviour.29 Leg-
islation may be used to inform the tort framework with causal definitions
to the extent that the costs of creating and adjusting such definitions
are exceeded by the benefits of more refined causal determinations. In
CASE 1 through CASE 9, for example, a court may order C1 and/or
C2 to compensate P on the basis of a causal connection legislatively
created between particular types of activities (or members of the com-
munity who engage in them) and various possible events or conditions.
Where the tort system breaks down, however, it may be appropriate
for a legislature to establish an administrative compensation scheme.
This safety net would operate, for example, when C1 and C2 are insolvent
or unreachable, or where the legislature has determined that the web
of causation is simply too difficult to dissect, as perhaps is the situation
in CASE 10.
218 Although this article discusses causal problems in the context of the retrospective com-
pensation of injuries, similar problems arise with respect to the enjoining of potential hazards.
The use of legislation is perhaps even more crucial in the latter context than the former. Where
the stakes are so high, it is difficult to see how the indeterminacies of the common law could
be preferred to the clarity, coherence, and likely activism of legislation. Cf. B.H. Wildsmith, "Of
Herbicides and Humankind: Palmer's Common Law Lessons" (1986) 24 O.H.LJ. 161 at 162.
Wildsmith argues that in an action for an injunction restraining the use of "suspect chemicals,"
a judge should reverse the burden of proof.
... it is appropriate for a judge to respond to cases involving suspect chemicals in the face
of scientific uncertainty by finding the chemicals presumptively unsafe, despite the inability
of the plaintiff to demonstrate the likelihood of harm, unless the defendant is able to prove
on the balance of probabilities that the chemicals are safe. Note that this view circumvents
problems of causation in fact, but does, in its reference to 'suspect' chemicals, retain a need
for some minimal rational connection between the chemicals and harm; there must be some
reason to regard the chemicals as unsafe before reversing the burden of proof (ibid. at 179,
emphasis added).
Wildsmith refers with approval to the injunction granted against discharges from a taconite processing
plant in Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency (1975) 514 F.2d 492 (U.S.C.A.,
8th Cir.), which he says illustrates the approach to causation taken in Cook (supra, note 37) and
McGhee (supra, note 149). Surely clear and direct legislative intervention is preferable to the vagaries
of this minimalist approach in ensuring that the law does not "prefer herbicides to humankind"
(cf. Wildsmith, ibid. at 186)?
219 Cf. text following supra, note 180.
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The technical details of a compensation system that deals with the
manifold difficult problems of causation are beyond the scope of this
article. Nevertheless, the steps taken here toward a linguistic analysis
of causation suggest a compensation system that would operate both
within and beyond the realm of tort. Within the tort system, legislation
may be used - where cost effective - to reduce the linguistic inde-
terminacy inherent in the process of judging causation. In some circum-
stances, however, the legislature may have to go beyond the tort system
to meet the responsibility imposed upon a community by the linguistic
model of causation presented in this article.
V. CONCLUSION
The journey into the law of causation in tort is profoundly disquieting.
Not only does a causal question turn up - explicitly or implicitly -
in almost every case brought before a court (whether in tort or not),
but the stakes involved in the outcome of a causal determination are
very high indeed. The deeper one ploughs through the jungle of arbitrary,
irreconcilable, and sometimes incoherent common law decisions on
causation, the more one senses both the importance and the difficulty
of finding a safe route out. Some, like Hart and Honor6, will choose
to return along the same path by which they entered, neatly documenting
their progress along the way in terms of a catalogue of "ordinary causal
language." Such a strategy certainly gives to this jungle an appearance
of order, but it advances one no further than the point from which one
set out. Others, like Richard Wright, will get sucked into the jungle itself
in search of an elusive test of pure factual causation. Still others will
take the earliest exit, giving up on causation altogether.
The approach suggested in this article is directed toward providing
one means of facing causal issues by capturing that middle ground between
causal maximalism and minimalism that appears to elude Hart and
Honor6. This approach attempts to avoid either falling back on an opaque
notion of necessity, or jumping to the conclusion that language is merely
a transparent prism through which to refract a particular legal ideology.
My linguistic model is not grounded in the assumption that meaning
can be cajoled,220 coaxed,22, or carved22 out of legal texts, nor is it swept
away in a current of textual nihilism: legal discourse may be no less
220 See, for example, the description of John Hart Ely in Levinson, supra, note 206 at 380-
81.
221 See, for example, Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation," supra, note 5.
222 See, for example, Fiss, supra, note 204.
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contingent than "human attempts to link the stars,"23 but it is the
imperative of those who engage in legal discourse to build causal
constellations that are as clear and coherent as possible.
"Cause in fact" decisions are permeated by non-factual consider-
ations. The model presented above attempts to explain how these
considerations can be integrated into a coherent legal system. It draws
on a linguistic modification of Hume's account of causation, on the
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and on a metaphor
of holistic relativism. It describes the process that underlies the verbal
formulae a judge uses in dealing with the "cause in fact" problem as
the positing of a linguistic copula to link two posited statements within
her or his causal web. Finally, it invites the lawmaker to create a sys-
tematic catalogue of such statements for the judge to apply to particular
tort cases, and in some circumstances to venture outside the tort system
to compensate particular victims caught within a community's causal
web.
Like any theory of the way the law does or should work, aspects
of this model are incomplete, difficult to apply, and perhaps even
dangerous. It would be foolish to aspire to descriptive and prescriptive
exhaustiveness, as did the earlier law and economics movement.224 Of
course, one crucial difference is that the linguistic model by definition
recognises that it is entrapped within the bounds of language, admits
that its explanatory and normative force is limited, and accepts the
economic school as a legitimate language community. For these very
reasons, the linguistic analysis developed in this article might be usefully
applied in other legal contexts.
The choice of causal statements is ultimately an ideological one.
Divorced from an understanding of the ideological context of the
epistemological, linguistic, and ontological layers of a community's causal
web, a linguistic analysis may easily be manipulated.22s Informed by such
an understanding, however, it may clarify what the "causal chain gang"
does and perhaps even lead toward the creation of better causal "chains"
in the future. Ronald Dworkin concludes his account of the law as a
223 Cf Levinson, supra, note 206 at 402.
224 See, for example, P. Posner, Economic Anaysis of Law, 1st ed. (1972).
225 A.C. Hutchinson argues that by according transcendent status to ahistorical or metalinguistic
"truth," Fish's approach tends to legitimize the hierachy of liberal society by obscuring the "grubby
facts of social history" with a pseudo-scientific characterization of meaning as an interaction between
reader and text. Life is more important than truth, and thus a political account of the power structure
underlying the hermeneutical question is required. In short, "politics, art and law are not so much
united in philosophy as art, law and philosophy are united in politics." A.C. Hutchinson, "Power
and Interpretation" (March, 1985) [unpublished]. Cf Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation," supra, note
5 at 550.
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"chain enterprise" with these words: "I end simply by acknowledging
my sense that politics, art, and law are united somehow in philosophy."226
If politics, art, law, and philosophy are united in anything apart from
the web of belief itself, they are united in language, the material in which
that web consists. In talking about the language of causation we are
doing no more and no less than exploring the causal web within which
we are entrapped.
226 Ibid.
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